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Models of Quality for Third Parties in
Alternative Dispute Resolution
CAROLE SILVER"

I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become a popular and
accepted part of the national and international legal systems.' In the United
States, ADR encompasses both private mechanisms and court-attached
procedures used for resolving disputes. 2 In international commerce, the

. Senior Research Associate, American Bar Foundation. My thanks to Bryant
Garth for
thinking about these issues with me and for reading successive versions of the article, to
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, John O'Hare, Susan Shapiro, Peter Siegelman and Dan Tarlock for
their comments on earlier drafts, and to Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth for sharing their ideas
and data in the context of their arbitration project.
1 One indication of popularity is the number of persons offering to serve as third parties
in ADR proceedings. A vivid illustration of the growth in popularity using this standard of
measurement is the publication of MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORY
(1994). See also Laura Duncan, Ethics Standardsfor MediationField Taking Shape, CnIcAoo
DAiLY L. BULL., March 30, 1994, at 1 ("In the early 1980s, there were just a handful of
private mediation firms nationwide, compared with some 800 companies doing business
today."). But see Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996,
at 55, 61 (noting that "[wihile some growth of ADR seems assured, the acceptance that is the
key to its expansion is less so.").
2 This article does not address specifically the merits of court-attached ADR. See
generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993). On the
relationship of ADR to litigation and settlement of litigation, see Judith Resnick, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 211, 265 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. LJ. 2663
(1995); SUSAN KEIuTz, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, NATIONAL SYMpOSiUM ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
COURT-CONNECT
PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Cultre: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or 'The Law of
ADR', 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). For an interesting analysis of the influence of ADR
on the legal system and lawyers, see Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practiceof
Law: Hierarchyand Pacificationin the Movement to Re-Form DisputeIdeology, 9 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
One explanation for the acceptance of ADR as an alternative to court adjudication is
suggested in Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808,
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alternative to litigation generally takes the form of arbitration, and it is an
integral part of business transacted across national borders. 3 There are a
variety of procedures included within the ADR label, 4 and each procedure
provides a role for a third party (TP) 5 in the effort to resolve the dispute. 6
1824-1825 (1986). Aschuler identifies the complexity of procedures in litigation as a partial
cause of court delay and argues, "Customary American trial procedures are plainly
unworkable in small-stakes cases .... [Ihfthe truth be told, American trial procedures are not
very serviceable for mid-stakes cases either." Id. at 1825. ADR procedures became part of the
litigation process formally in many jurisdictions after the passage of the Civil Justice Reform
Act in 1990. See also Resnick, supra, at 265 (describing ADR as a movement by which "[t]he
focus is shifting from adjudication to resolution"). See generally Lauren Robel, Fractured
Procedure: The Cvil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994).
3 The term "ADR" is not always used to refer to international commercial arbitration,
but here I use the term in its broadest sense, as meaning all forms of dispute resolution offered
in place of litigation, where a third party participates in the procedure. See ELZABETH ROLPH
ET AL., ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOS
ANGET
2 (1994) [hereinafter ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE] ("For the purposes of this
inquiry, we define private ADR as any dispute resolution service providedfor a fee by a thirdparty neutral outside the court system."). Although arbitration is the preferred method for
international dispute resolution, other methods sometimes are also used. See, e.g., Philip
Naughton, Letterfrom London: ADR Begins to Find its Placein Britain, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. 86 (1992); Steven J. Burton, Combining Conciliation with
Arbitration ofInternational Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 637
(1995); Jan Paulsson, Fast-TrackArbitration in Europe (With Special Reference to the WIPO
Expedited Arbitration Rules), 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 713, 715 (1995)
(describing WIPO Expedited Arbitration as "offering the international community a choice
between two systems of arbitration"); see also CommercialArbitrationand Mediation Center
for the Americas Founded to Resolve NAFTA Private InternationalCommercial Cross-Border
Disputes, 7 WORLD ARE. AND MEDIATION REP. 7 (1996).
4 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and
Definitions in Dispute Resolution as Stakes in a Professional Competition About the 'Rules of
the Game', 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 285 (1996) [hereinafter Dezalay & Garth, FussingAbout
the Forn]; Robert A. Baruch Bush, DEFINING QUALITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
TAXONOMIES AND ANTI-TAXONOMIES OF QUALITY ARGUMENTS 14-19 (1988).
W
5 I use the abbreviation "TP
" instead of another term because other terms either involve
association with one ADR method or another, as with arbitrator or mediator, or imply the
issues to be discussed in this article, as when the term "neutral" is used.
6 Negotiation by disputants without the participation of a TP sometimes is also
considered part of ADR. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG Er AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3 (1992)
("The most common form of dispute resolution is negotiation. Compared to processes using
'third parties,' negotiation has the advantage of allowing the parties themselves to control the
process and the solution."). The authors list seven kinds of proceedings in which a third party
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In arbitration the role of TP is played by the arbitrator(s), in mediation by
the mediator and in early neutral evaluation by the evaluator, just as in court
the role is played by the judge.
As ADR has gained acceptance and use in the United States, increased
attention has been focused on the qualities of TPs. The quality of the
arbitrator has consistently been acknowledged as being the single most
important determinant of quality in arbitration; similarly, less directive TPs
in facilitative procedures, such as mediation, also play a pivotal role in the
success of the process.7 Identifying the "best" qualities for TPs is currently
under discussion as organizations within and outside of government attempt
to regulate TPs to ensure fairness and competence.8 Concern has been
expressed about the need for training and substantive expertise, the sorts of

is used.
7 See Katie Brown, Retreatfrom Courtroom Battles Made Phillips Mediation Pioneer,
S.F. Bus. TIMES, May 30, 1988, at 12 ("Mediation is only as good as the quality of your
mediator.") (quoting San Francisco attorney Randy Wulft); Alfred Knoll, Commentary:
Testing ADR, RECORDER, Apr. 3, 1995, at 8 (reporting that judicial quality was the principal
public concern articulated in the report of the California State Judicial Council on the judicial
system); Stephen R. Bond, The Experience ofthe ICC in the Confirmation/Appointment Stage
ofan Arbitration, in ICC, THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS
9 (ICC Publishing, S.A. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Eperience ofthe ICC] ("Everyone is familiar
with the expression that 'an arbitration is only as good as the arbitrator.").
8 See Symposiwn: Certiflcation of Mediators in California, 30 U.S.F., L. REV. 609
(1996). ADR has been criticized on grounds of fairness by scholars, described generally in
Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths,
1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55; by observers, see Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pitfallsfor
Conswners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994, § 1, at 37; and, in particular circumstances, even by
ADR industry participants, see JAMS/Endispute Issues Minimun Standardsfor Employment
Arbitration, 6 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 50-51 (1995). For a general criticism of
ADR and its impact on the justice system, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Setlement, 93 YALE
LJ. 1073 (1984).
Indications of interest in regulating standards of conduct for ADR third parties include
John Feerick et al., Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1995 J. DIsp. RESOL. 95, 95-98 [hereinafter Standards of Professional Conduct]; Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's
Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989); Eperience of the
ICC, supra note 7, at 9; JointAAAIABA/SPIDR Committee Issues Draft Standardsof Conduct
for Mediators, 5 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 207 (1994); CPR Forms Ethics Group,
13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF Lrrlo. 14 (1995). See Judith Resnck, Failing

Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. Rvrv. 494, 544-546 (1986)
(considering the importance of the issue of qualities of TPs with regard to the impact on the
justice system).
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conflicts of interest likely to exert influence on TPs, appropriate standards
of disclosure and the role--with respect to these issues-of different forms
of organizations offering TP services. 9 This attention to the needs and
characteristics of TPs and ADR has been frustrated by the absence of
information about the market in ADR services, resulting in part from the
confidentiality surrounding most ADR activities. Secrecy has exacerbated
the effort to determine how best to regulate TPs, or whether regulation is
10
even necessary.
This Article will consider the general question of what a "good" TP
looks like; that is, what qualities are necessary for a TP to be acceptable to
the parties and effective generally in resolving disputes. 11 There are at least
two reasons to address this issue. First, TPs are in a unique position. They
are not advocates, so attorney regulations are not entirely relevant, yet they
are also distinct from judges, both in their function in some instances and in
the influences exerted upon them because of the nature of the market for
disputing services. 12 New models must be generated to position TPs in

9 Other issues have also been raised in recent discussions about regulating ADR,
including fee structures and the role of ADR service provider firms. See Standards of
Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 97; CPR Forms Ethics Group, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COSTS OF LrTo. 14 (1995) (noting that the CPR ethics group will "look at issues of
accountability, quality, conflicts of interest, access, and blurring of public-private functions"
regarding organizations that provide ADR services on a large scale).
10 There have been a variety of efforts to collect information; two of the principal
sponsors of such efforts are the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, which published ESCAPING
THE COURTHOUSE (1994), as well as Elizabeth Rolph & Erik Moller, EVALUATING AGENCY
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS (1995) and the University of Wisconsin
Dispute Processing Research Program. See also SUSAN SCOTT, CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, LAW FIRM PRACTICES INADR: SURVEY FINDINGS (1995).
11I will consider this question for all TPs, regardless of the method of dispute resolution
selected, because I believe that the issue has importance as a general matter in the context of a
substitute for litigation; if a difference in proceedings and consequent roles is relevant to the
inquiry, it will be recognized in the analysis.
12 Ile TP's role resembles the judge's with regard to the influence exerted over the
parties. Even in mediation, the TP can and often does influence the parties in spite of his
facilitative role. See Dezalay & Garth, Fussing About the Forun, supra note 4. The
responsibility of a judge resulting from his power over the rights and interests of others is
described by Alsehuler:
[W]hen a business executive... gives short shrift to an argument about how to respond
to a competitor's marketing initiative.. . the person who advanced the argument may
reply, 'It's your company,' .... When, however, a judge gives short shrift to Farmer
Brown's claim that he owns the colt, the judge does not make a decision about 'his'
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appropriate contexts, but because of the combination of scarcity of
information and fierce competition for business among TPs and hopeful
TPs, the models offered thus far have been grounded more upon advocacy
than upon observation. 13 That is to say, the models tend to be offered by
partisans with an academic and even economic interest in promoting a
particular model that fits their own position.
Second, governmental and other organizations in the United States are
regulating ADR and TPs, 14 but the common regulatory approach is
company ....He makes a decision about Farmer Brown's rights. Decisions ordinarily
are the province of the parties most affected by them. Adjudication, however, differs
from ordinary decision making in entrusting a choice to a person who is not affected by
it, a person who has special obligationsto those whose interests are at stake.
Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1844 (emphasis added). TPs are similarly responsible to
disputants, even if their role is not adjudicative, because their conduct influences the outcome
of the proceedings. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature
of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 60 (1988) ("One way to make private
justice acceptable to the system of public justice is, of course, to have it approximate the
public system's own standards."). Similarly, the acceptability of TPs in ADR may be based in
part on their comparability to public judges.
On the appropriateness of and parameters for lawyers acting as TPs generally, see
Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor The Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L.
REV. 329 (1984); Note, Professional Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard
Governing NonrepresentationalAttorney Mediation, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 213 (1993). For
a discussion of the unique role of mediators, see Robert D. Benjamin, The Mediator as
Trickster: The Folkloric Figure as Professional Role Model, 13 MEDIATION Q. 131 (1995).
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts and MediationPractice, DISP. REsoL., Spring 1996, at
5 (commenting on the limitations of analogizing to lawyer conflict of interest rules for
conflicts involving TPs).
13 Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush offers an example of this position, in urging that
one "conception of the mediation process and the mediator's role" should be adopted as the
basis for determining uniform standards for mediators. See Bush, supra note 8, at 257. See
also Knoll, supra note 7, at 8; Peter S. Caldwell, The Training of Arbitrators and Quality
Assurance ofArbitration, 9 J. INT'L AR. 99 (1992).
14
See generally Current Trends in Neutral Qualifications, 5 WORLD ARB. AND
MEDIATION REP. 13, 13-22 (1994); Standards of Conduct for Mediators, reprinted in 5
WORLD ARE. AND MEDIATION REP. 223, 223-225 (1994) (prepared by a joint committee of
the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution); CPR Forms Ethics Group, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COSTS OF LrITO. 14 (1995); Charles Guittard, Mediation for Mediators, TEX. LAW.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 16 ("Mediators must come together in a 'quality' collaboration to address
the need to ensure quality mediator services .... iThere is little disagreement about the need
for broad-based measures to protect the public from substandard mediators."); Tom
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15
formalistic at best; mediators are subject to one set of regulations,

McDonald, Finding a Win-Win Solution, TEX. LAW., Mar. 4, 1996, at 15 (competition
between lawyers and non-lawyer mediators); New York Court PanelProposes Expanded ADR,
7 WORLD ARE. AND MEDIATION REP. 7 (1996) (panel recommends "training protocols for
neutrals" who work in court-attached ADR).
Education programs for TPs have proliferated. See, e.g., UMass Boston Offers Masters
in Dispute Resolution, Highlighting a Growing Trend, 6 WORLD ARE. AND MEDIATION REP.
72 (1995). Furthermore, efforts are increasing to restrict entry to TP work to those with
particular training. Some of these efforts can be seen as attempts to control the market by
lawyers. See, e.g., Broad Reforms Envisionedfor Securities Arbitration, 5 WORLD ARE. AND
MEDIATION REP. 252, 252-254 (1994) (discussing a proposed amendment to the Uniform
Code of Arbitration to prohibit participation in securities arbitrations by most non-lawyers);
New ADR Referrals Only for Attorneys, MAss. LAw., July 17, 1995, at 1. Other efforts are
aimed more at skills training in ADR methodology. See Fraser Hubbard, Arbitration,
Mediation Becoming PopularAlternatives to Litigation, 9 WARFIELD'S BUS. REC., Nov. 18,
1994, at 9. Hubbard comments:
[E]ffective legal representation in Maryland requires knowledge and skills regarding
when to decide to use ADR and how best to use it. These skills involve the subtle arts of
negotiation and the practical requirements of ADR, subjects now fixtures in law school
curricula nationally and in local continuing legal education efforts sponsored by state
bar associations.
Id. See also Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 115-117 (statement of
Professor Kimberlee Kovach); William Hathaway, A New Way of Viewing Dispute Resolution
Training, 13 MEDIATION Q. 37 (1995).
15 FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APP'T. MEDIATORS R. 10.010-10.290 (requires training,
observation and supervision and, in some cases, a particular academic degree); GA. CT. R.,
APP. B, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 2 (mediators must have twenty hours of
classroom training and at least five supervised mediation observation or co-mediation
experiences); N.J. CT. R. 3.2 (Municipal Court mediators must complete eighteen hours of
20/2
training, continuing mediation training is also required); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 710,
(Smith-Hurd 1992) (defining mediator as "a person who has received at least thirty hours of
training in the areas of negotiation, nonverbal communication, agreement writing, neutrality
and ethics"; this definition covers persons who perform court-attached mediation as well as
mediation at tax exempt centers in Illinois); IND. CT. R. 2.5 (mediators in court-attached
mediation must complete at least forty hours of training, and for civil cases must be an
attorney, unless the parties otherwise agree) and R. 2.8 (guidelines for subsequent
representation of parties); OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 718-40.020 to 718-40-050 (establishes thirty
hours minimum of mediation training, and an additional six hours of training in court system,
for mediators); UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-510(3)(B) & (D) (requiring thirty hours of
training and ten hours of experience, and that mediators conduct at least six mediations
annually). This list of state provisions is not exhaustive. See generally Symposium:
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arbitrators another, 16 and many of these rules apply only to court-attached
procedures. 17 This approach ignores the commonality among dispute
resolution procedures as well as the variety within any particular label.18
The biggest differences, indeed, may not be between what is labeled
arbitration or mediation, but rather among dispute-resolution practices
described with the same formal name. 19 By ignoring this diversity,
regulation of ADR and TPs cannot produce the desired quality.
Cerlficationof MediatorsIn California, supra note 8.
16
Among the state rules addressing arbitrator standards are FLA. R. CT. APP'T ARE. R.
1.810 (b) & (c) (requiring arbitrators for at least the chairman of a tribunal, if more than one
arbitrator serves] to "have been a member of the Florida Bar for at least 5 years" and to
attend a 4-hour training course; the 5-year bar requirement may be waived by the parties.);
WASH. R. SUPER. CT. R. 3.1 (requiring arbitrator to be "a member of the Washington State
Bar Association who has been admitted to the Bar for a minimum of 5 years, or who is a
retired judge" and permitting the parties to select a nonlawyer arbitrator.); GA. CT. R., APP.
B, ALTERNATIVW DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 2 (requiring that arbitrators must be lawyers, and
the chairman of the panel, or the sole arbitrator if there is no panel, must have at least 5 years
experience as a lawyer, the arbitrators must also complete six hours of training in a CLE
approved program); UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-510(3)(C) and (E) (requiring arbitrators
to have been members of the bar for ten years, and to conduct at least three arbitrations
annually).
17 For example, the Texas state and federal rules apply to TPs (regardless of the form of
proceeding) in court-attached cases. See W.D. TEX. LoC. CT. R. CV-88(d)(1) (1995)
(requiring at least forty hours of training in an approved course for certification of neutrals,
and law degree, or requiring judicial experience); Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
§ 154.052 requires TPs to have completed a minimum of forty hours of classroom training in
"dispute resolution techniques" and, for family disputes, requires an additional period of
subject-related training. See generally Robert B. Moberly, Ehical Standards for CourtAppointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 701 (1994). For a comprehensive examination of federal court-attached ADR programs,
see EuZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEhMNT IN THE FEDERAL

DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (CPR ed., 1995).
18
See Dezalay & Garth, Fussing About the Forum, supra note 4; but see Richard C.
Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 55 ("A fundamental
difference between mediation and binding methods of dispute resolution is that in mediation,
the parties decide themselves how to resolve their differences, with the mediator helping them
get past their 'positions' so that their real interests can be addressed.").
19 Regulators should also consider the competitive effect of training requirements upon
other methods of ADR for which training is not required and upon TPs whose expertise and
attractiveness are irrelevant to such training; such requirements may divide the pool of TPs
available for court-attached ADR from those available for private ADR, if the requirements
for training or licensing apply only to one group.
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In considering the question of what quality means for TPs, we should
not overlook the obvious: the wide variety of TPs doing ADR work today
embody widely different notions of quality. Cyrus Vance, who acted as
mediator in the Macy's bankruptcy, is a different kind of TP than the
securities arbitrators who resolve industry disputes. Yet another kind of TP
is the former judge who offers to serve as an arbitrator or mediator in
private dispute resolution after leaving the bench. We recognize intuitively
that these examples represent different versions of TPs; we can guess that
Cyrus Vance, as a notable, will not be challenged on the basis of conflicts
of interest which would present a problem for the securities arbitrator in an
industry dispute. It is partly that there is a dual market in ADR: one market
20
for large dollar amount disputes and one market for smaller disputes. But
the differences are deeper than this; they also reside in the versions of
quality these TPs offer.
Our recognition that different kinds of TPs participate in the ADR
market has not yet permeated the regulation of ADR and the role TPs play.
This failure of regulation to reflect and integrate the fact of variety arises, at
least in part, because our recognition of variety is indefinite. We lack
empirical models to illuminate the differences among TPs as well as the
response to those differences in the approach required by regulation. This
Article fills that void by offering a new vision of TPs and the contexts in
which they offer their services based upon unique data regarding the
identity and practices of TPs. The data is derived from interviews with more
than two hundred individuals involved in ADR and international
commercial arbitration. 21 The data is especially useful given the secrecy

20

See generally What We Know-And Don't Know-About Mediation, DIsP. REsoL. F.,

Oct. 1989, at 9, 12 (comments of Sally Engle Merry). Ms. Engle Merry explains:
There is a top tier of ADR which is expensive and in which mediators are highly paid,
and a bottom tier in which the parties have low incomes and mediators volunteer, or are
paid little. One way to understand these differences is to look at what each alternative is
replacing. At the top tier, ADR replaces high-priced legal services... in the bottom
tier, community mediation replaces court services which are already virtually free or
completely free to the public.

Id.
21 The interviews were conducted by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, and are the basis
for their book. See generally YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEAUNG IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LEGAL
PRACTICE (1996). Transcripts of the interviews are on file with the American Bar Foundation.
The interviews indicate that very different conceptions of independence and conflicts of
interest are at work among the participants in the international market for disputing services;
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surrounding much of ADR; furthermore, the data offers a national and
international perspective for the role and work of TPs. 22 The international
perspective clarifies the role of TPs and ADR in the United States as a
contrast and complement; in addition, an international perspective is
important as ADR moves into transnational and foreign practice. The data's
geographical breadth is complemented by a breadth of perspective-those
interviewed had experience as lawyers, consultants and TPs in international
arbitration, domestic arbitration, mediation and in the judiciary-which
provides a view of the competition for dispute resolution work. The
diversity and richness of the data allow me to avoid the problem of partial
views, common in the discussion-partial in the sense of being based on
only one side's perspective or because of an attempt to impose the author's
vision rather than contemplating the full complexity of practices and

positions.
The Article begins in section IH with an abstract discussion of the
elements necessary for a "good" TP, that is, a TP whose dispute resolution
work is characterized by fairness and effectiveness. "Quality" for a TP
generally can be defined in terms of the TP's impartiality and authority.
What these terms, authority and impartiality, mean, of course, is subject to
considerable debate. The contours of these terms change with different TPs.
We must assess both whether the version of authority and impartiality
offered by a particular model is satisfactory, and whether the promised

some of these differences can be understood as arising from the legal cultures of the
participants.
The data are based on the interviews, rather than on numerical information. For a fuller
description of the data, see DEZAIAY & GARTH, supra. Within this paper, the interviews are
designated solely by number and page. This is due to confidentiality concerns.
22 In the United States, there tends to be a parochial vision of ADR; sometimes
definitions of ADR exclude arbitration, neglecting the larger world of dispute resolution
services and the continuum, within this world, of procedures ranging from judicial efforts to
private negotiation. This vision of a continuum is helpful not only to establish the relationship
between one segment of the market and another-because regulation of one segment has an,
impact on other segments, in terms of competition between and among them and the TPs who
service them-but also to see ADR as perhaps an extension of the litigator-dealer lawyer
dichotomy acknowledged in practice.
Often these definers fail to consider international arbitration as relevant to their work. An
international view, however, helps to place the U.S. market in context, and it reveals the
forces and competition which the market faces as ADR goes international. See CPR Selects
European Panel, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LrTIo. 66 (1993); Jacques
Werner, ADR: Will European Brains Be Set on Fire?, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 45 (1993); JeanClaude Goldsmith, ICC Woring Group Report on ADR, 4 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 413
(1993); DEZALAY& GARTH, supra note 21, at 179-181.
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version is actually delivered.
Following this general discussion, section m describes six models of
TPs, each of which offers a distinct picture of quality. The models are based
upon the interviews described above and are presented in sequence from
most to least elite, most self-regulatory to least self-regulatory-ranging
from the elite small group of TPs, whose members offer their services on
the basis of personal prestige and expertise and who depend upon personal
referrals for business, to the large number of TPs whose common
characteristic is essentially that their presumed expertise is based upon
procedural training or substantive experience, and who have virtually no
relationship to one another. The six models offer insight into the
competition for the business of dispute resolution; when taken together, the
models suggest that there is not one unified market in dispute resolution
services in the United States.
This description and analysis of the models is necessarily detailed
because it is critical to provide sufficient detail to reveal the texture of the
versions of quality depicted. Each of these versions of quality has found a
place in the international market for dispute resolution services. We can use
these models to better understand the authority that different TPs bring to
ADR, and consequently to consider different analytical approaches to these
various settings.
The models indicate that in some settings we can rely upon the market
as it operates, and in certain settings the TPs police themselves with regard
to problems of quality. But in other situations, the market is ineffective
because of insufficient available information, an absence of group selfregulation and poor monitoring of TPs' activities. This Article will not go
into great detail about how to regulate every sort of TP, but the general
contours of a variety of regulatory approaches are outlined in section IV.
Section IV brings us back to the three examples of TPs described abovethe notable, the former judge and the securities industry specialist-and
explains how the models suggest appropriate analytical and regulatory
approaches for these specific examples.
II. IMPARTIALrrY AND AUTHORrrY

A. Authority
A TP must possess authority to act in a dispute. This authority is the
reason for the parties' willingness to cooperate with the TP and, in
arbitration, to abide by the decision. 23 Authority validates the TP's power

23 A judge, for example, gains authority from her connection to the state and the state's
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and participation in the dispute.
Two varieties of authority are relevant to this inquiry. First, a TP may
have personal authority, meaning status and respect apart from the particular
dispute. Second, the TP may have contextual authority, which means that
the TP has some special ability relevant to a dispute. Personal authority and
contextual authority are related and may even overlap in certain
circumstances.
A TP's personal authority may arise from his social or economic
position; his status, apart from the context of dispute resolution, places him
in a respected position. The separation of the TP from the subject of the
dispute is important here. His personal authority may place him above the
need for financial or reputational compensation for his work, and his status
is not dependent upon the dispute for validation. 24 The TP's indifference to
future business and to the substance of the dispute, and the resulting absence
of a need to please the disputants, creates an aura of independence, even
superiority. In this respect, the personal authority of the 'i? places him in a
position analogous to the judge, who has no need to be concerned about

future business due to the term of his appointment and the fact that case
assignment is divorced from the judge's identity. While many TPs offer
personal authority, others do not.
Contextual authority, however, is important for all TPs. Contextual
authority supports the work of a particular TP in a particular dispute, and it
arises because of the TP's efforts, as opposed to his status. Contextual
authority may result from the general professional experience of a TP in
dealing with the substantive issues involved in the dispute. Experience in
the work of, or apart from, ADR supports this authority, as does
scholarship. 25 Contextual authority based upon expertise in a particular
legal or other theory26 relevant to the dispute, which may be revealed in

power over its citizens. Judges are authorized by the state to use and develop law in deciding
cases. Similarly, TPs working in court-connected ADR programs may be directed to base

their actions upon legal principles and precedent. The private TP is neither authorized by the
state, nor necessarily directed to decide or act according to law. On the consistency of
settlements with legal principles, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2 at 2675-2676.
24 Scholars whose status is tied to a particular theoretical perspective stand somewhat
apart here because their reputations may be affected by the influence of their scholarship on a
particular dispute.
25 Experience gives the TP a breadth of vision which might encompass other legal
systems, particularly relevant in international commercial arbitration, and other value systems,
which might provide support for TPs whose actions need not be directly based upon legal
rights. Scholarship might link the TP's work with principles of decisionmaking or negotiation.
26 For a discussion of the reliance on theoretical bases outside of law for decisionmaking

and authority, see Yves Dezalay, Negotiated Justice: The French Example, in BEYoND
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scholarship, has characterized international arbitrators. For example, in
international commercial arbitration, the authority of certain academics was
connected to their scholarship regarding the lex mercatoria. 27
A TP may also create contextual authority through his ADR work in
substantively related disputes. Particularly in technical or very sophisticated
matters, such expertise gained from repetitive work results in gains for the
disputants, in terms of time savings and perhaps even quality of
decisionmaking; the repeated exposure, however, also creates the possibility
for bias. 28 Notwithstanding this concern, special panels of TPs with

DISPUTING: EXPLORING LEGAL CULTURE IN FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 129 (Konstaze PleR

& Cathy Meschievitz eds., 1991) (In some areas--such as business affairs, labor, juvenile
delinquency-doctrinal investment is low or recent and undeveloped; "as a result there is a
need in such fields to mobilize social resources emanating from the upper echelons, to
mobilize expertise in order to solve disputes: ... experts that range from social workers in
juvenile courts right up to the great experts on maritime arbitration.").
27 Lex mercatoria refers to the idea that there exists an autonomous legal system to
govern international commercial relations. One of the principal proponents of l= mercatoria
was Professor Berthold Goldman. See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, 7he Complementary Roles of
Judges and Arbitrators in Ensuring that InternationalCommercial Arbitration is Effective, in
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SIXTY YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION 255 (1984).

For another interesting view of the lex mercatoria, see Michael Mustill, The New Lex
Mercatoria: The First Tweny-Five Years, in LIBR AMERICORUM FOR THE RIGHT HONORABLE
LORD WILBERFORCE 149-184 (Boa et al. eds., 1987). The theory of lx mercatoria was the
subject of considerable attention, both supportive and critical, by international arbitratorscholars. A helpful starting point is W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 603-641 (2d ed. 1990). Only the senior grand professors were
considered qualified to work with the le mercatoria;their personal authority gave legitimacy
to the theory. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
ConstructingInternationalJusticefrom the Competitionfor TransnationalBusiness Disputes,
29 L. & Soc'YREv. 27, 35-42 (1995).
28 Pierre Lalive, a senior European arbitrator, cautions, "Expression of advice on a legal
matter is not per se exclusive of the future independence of spirit or impartiality, and only
fools, it may seem, never change their mind." He argued that an arbitrator's prior expression
of views on a particular substantive issue should not be used to disqualify him. Pierre Lalive,
Conclusions, in THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS 119, 126
(ICC Publishing, S.A. ed., 1991).
This same experience, however, also creates a potential for bias, either with regard to
disputants, to the extent that they are common to several disputes, or with respect to an
ideological position common to the disputes. According to Pierre Bellet, a well-known French
judge and international arbitrator, "it is more serious to have been connected with the subject
matter of the dispute than to have known the party, as that is not a question of friendship, but
of self-esteem, which is by far the stronger feeling." See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The
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expertise in a particular substantive area are offered by ADR firms;
similarly, specialized courts have recently been created to provide
29
experienced judges for particular kinds of disputes.
Contextual authority also may be based upon specific training
completed by a TP, such as the training programs offered in the techniques
of ADR work. 30 Similarly, experience in problem solving or negotiating
generally, apart from the context of dispute resolution, also supports
contextual authority. In this regard, the personal authority of a TP may
support contextual authority as well, where, for example, the TP's personal
authority derives from status as a negotiator. 31 Contextual authority shifts
with the dispute; it is not constant with any particular TP.

B. Impartiality
Impartiality ensures that a TP's actions will be based upon the merits of
the dispute rather than the personal influence or identity of the disputants.
TPs must be impartial in order for parties to feel that they are being treated
32
fairly; it supports their confidence in the decisionmaking process.
Arbitrator:One Man, Three Roles, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 7, 16 n.14 (1988) (Bedjaoui explains,
"This remark was thrown into the discussion on the case of one party's counsel becoming an
arbitrator."). See generallyGeoffrey C. Hazard & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature ofPrivate
Aducation, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 50-52 (1988).
29
JAMS/Endispute has created panels of TPs in bankruptcy and environmental work.
See JAMS/Endispute EstablishesBankruptcy Panel, 5 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 210
(1994). The rating system for FDIC/RTC neutrals gives experience acting as a TP more
weight in determining a TP's qualifications than other factors also dealing with participation in
ADR. See Report of the FDIC/RTC Roster Quaificatons Panel, 5 WORLD ARB. AND
MEDIATION REP. 17, 17-22 (1994).

The Delaware summary court procedures, see DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 124 & 125
(1995), are discussed in Quick and Clean: Delaware's Experiment, CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 1994, at 1; Delaware Approves Alternative Business Court, 5 WORLD ARB. AND
MEDIATION REP. 29 (1994). See generally Margaret M. Eckenbrecht, A Commercial Venture,
A.B.A. J.,Jan. 1996, at 35 ("Fifteen states that together comprise more than half the U.S.
population either have commercial divisions or are considering them.").
30 A number of states have adopted training requirements for TPs participating in courtattached ADR. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PERFORMANCE-BASED
ASSESSMENT:

A METHODOLOGY, FOR USE IN SELECTING,

TRAINING AND EVALUATING

MEDIATORS 19 (1995); see also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. Private ADR
service provider firms, schools and bar associations also offer training. See ESCAPING THE
COURTHOUSE, supra note 3, at 48.
31 See iqfra notes 77-83 (discussion of Cyrus Vance in the Macy's bankruptcy).
32 Fairness and confidence in the process are essential in ADR, in part because the right
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Impartiality goes to the essence of the difference between an advocate and a
TP. TPs occupy a position analogous to the judge in this regard; a judge's
impartiality requires her to decide cases based upon the evidence and
33
arguments, rather than grounds unrelated to the substance of the dispute.
Similarly, the TP's actions must be guided by the substance of the dispute
34
rather than by the relative power and influence of the parties.
Impartiality generally means the absence of bias. It has been described
as a "purely intellectual attitude," which may or may not be based upon a

to appeal is severely restricted. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994),
appeals are limited to cases where the award "was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means," or where there was "evident partiality or corruption" on the part of the arbitrators, or
where the arbitrators conducted the proceedings in a way that was prejudicial to one of the
parties. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). An award may be modified if it includes a matter as to which
the arbitrators lacked authority. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).
33 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353,
365-372 (1978) (the basis for a judge's decision in litigation is evidence and arguments); infra
notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussion of the judicial model). See also ABA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 3 (1990).
34
The comparison of an arbitrator's duty of impartiality to a judge's position regarding
impartiality has sometimes been urged, but because of the limited right to appeal an arbitration
decision, it could be argued that arbitrators should be subject to even stricter standards than
judges. The connections of TPs to disputants and to commerce, generally, however, have
supported standards of flexibility with regard to TPs on the issue of impartiality. For a
discussion of TP impartiality, see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). In a concurring opinion, Justice White stated:
The Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of
judicial decorum of Article HI judges .... It is often because they are men of affairs,
not apart from but of the marketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory
function. This does not mean the judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in giving
effect to their awards ....
But it does mean that arbitrators are not automatically
disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if both parties are
informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware of the facts but the
relationship is trivial.
Id. (White, J., concurring). See also Betz v. Pankow, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 107 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995); Lawrence F. Ebb, A Tale of Three Cities: Arbitrator Misconduct by Abuse of
Retainerand Commitment Fee Arrangements, 3 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 177, 180 (1992) ("The
underlying principle was pronounced by Lord Langdale in Harvey v. Shelton, 7 Beav. 455,
462, 46 Eng. Rep. 1141, 1143 (1844), laying down the rule that arbitrators 'must not permit
one side to use any means whatsoever for influencing the conduct and decisions of the
[Tribunal], which means were not known to the other side.' (emphasis added)").
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pre-existing relationship with the party towards whom there is bias. 35
Relationships may give rise to problems of impartiality, 3 6 but impartiality
also may arise without regard to a particular relationship with the TP.
Impartiality also can be defined as equal treatment; one who is impartial
treats both parties the same, regardless of whether their circumstances
indicate that equivalent results would be produced only by different or
37
unequal treatment.

35

See Mohammed Bedjaoui, CallengeofArbitralors, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
INA CHANGING WORLD 85, 90 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1993); the author also discusses
the relationship between impartiality and independence. For a thorough analysis of the issues
surrounding lawyers' independence apart from the context of ADR, see Robert W. Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
36 In certain circumstances, a relationship is so close that it establishes partiality, without
consideration of the particular facts surrounding the relationship. For example, in Morelite
Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council CarpentersBenefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1984), the court ruled that a parental relationship between the arbitrator and an officer of one
of the parties (actually, an officer of the international union, where the district union was a
party to the dispute) required vacation of the arbitrator's award because the relationship
established partiality on the part of the arbitrator.
37 See Leda M. Cooks & Claudia L. Hale, The Constructionof Ethics in Mediation, 12
MEDIAION Q. 55 (1994) (considering impartiality apart from neutrality). Impartiality means
an absence of bias because "[i]n
order to subscribe to the dictate of impartiality, a mediator
must refrain from acting as an advocate or assuming an adversarial role." Id. at 63. But
neutrality involves the idea of fairness; where differences in power or sophistication of the
parties result in one party needing the mediator's participation in order to equalize the two
sides, neutrality is obtained by such mediator participation. Cooks and Hale support the idea
that a mediator may need to treat parties differently in order to help them arrive at the same
level and reach a "neutral" agreement. Impartiality may appear compromised in achieving
neutrality. See Id. at 64.
See also COLORADO COUNCIL OF MEDIATION ORGANIZATIONS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDU r § 2 (1982), reprinted in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERO ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 478
(1992) (defining impartiality as "freedom from bias or favoritism either in word or action.
Impartiality implies a commitment to aid all parties, as opposed to a single
party .... Impartiality means that a mediator will not play an adversarial role in the process
of dispute resolution.*). For a similar use of the standard of impartiality, but in an active
sense, see Bush, supra note 8, at 281.
See generally Salah Al Hejailan, The Pre-arbitralPhase:Maers Affecting the Arbitral
Award, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION INA CHANGING WORLD 51-56 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 1993); Experience ofthe ICC, supra note 7, at 9; Stephen R. Bond, Current Issues
in Internafional CommercialArbitration:The InternationalArbiator:From the Perspective of
the ICCInternmtonalCourt ofArbitration, 12 J. INT'L L. AND BUS. 1 (1991).
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The difficulty with ensuring that TPs are impartial arises because, in
ADR, it is virtually impossible to eliminate all connections between the
parties and the TP. Disputants generally select a TP for each dispute, and
that selection is often based on prior relations between one or both of the
appointing parties, or their representatives, and the TP.38 This relationship
is absent when the controversy is taken to court, and that absence may be
one reason why parties opt out of the court system and choose ADR in the
first place. 3 9 The existence of a relationship between disputants and the TP
creates a problem for parties seeking both to appoint their preferred TP and
to select a TP who is impartial. The parties need a TP who will resolve the
dispute, or help them resolve their dispute, without regard to any
relationship which might have led to the TP's appointment.40 The basis for

38 In court-attached ADR, the court generally participates in the selection of the TP. See
generally Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Federal Court ADR: A Practidoner's
Update, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LrnIo. 7 (1996). But in private ADR, the
parties are free to select a TP in any agreed-upon manner. Especially if they do not use the
services of an ADR institution, they will be selecting based upon their personal knowledge of
potential TPs, references from advisors (also probably based upon personal knowledge), and
lists published by certain organizations which generally are too large to be helpful. As a
notable international arbitrator observed, "arbitration owes its legitimacy and success to the
fact that it was built upon the trust placed by the party in the arbitrator, whom it chose
because it knew him.... [A] 'certain relationship' between the party and the arbitrator
inevitably persists." Bedjaoui, supra note 35, at 86. A senior British arbitration participant
commented, "You're often appointed as a party arbitrator by someone with whom you have
worked before." Interview #10 at 13. A Continental lawyer reported, "I'm doing right now,
for instance, a brief against.., somebody who's been my co-arbitrator... in another case,
you see, and I mean it happens that way." Interview #16 at 16.
39 A U.S. lawyer involved in ADR commented:
One of these problems is the judges .... What the law firms are doing through us is
saying we need a panel of appropriate judges. We need to be able to say to our clients,
we can get you the kind of judge that is the kind of judge you think about when you
think about going to court, you know.
Interview #1 at 12-13.
40 The presence of ADR service provider firms creates an additional layer of
relationships relevant to the issue of bias. These firms, both profit and not-for-profit, may
contract with clients to administer all of their dispute resolution work; there may be imposed
upon the clients' customers an agreement to use the ADR service provider firm in any dispute
that might arise. See generally More Retail Banks Turn to Mandatory Arbitration, 5 WORLD
ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 232 (1994). This situation is worrisome because of the lack of
negotiation between the parties to the dispute about the identity of the ADR TP, or at least
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the TP's action might be legal rights, or it might be the interests of the
parties or another principle, but it should be unconnected to the TP's
relationship to the parties.
Two approaches-restriction and disclosure--have been used to
promote impartiality. Restriction aims at eliminating or restricting
relationships which might give rise to bias. Disclosure aims at informing the
disputants of sources of possible bias. These approaches are not necessarily
exclusive of one another.
Restriction operates in circumstances where the relationship between
the TP and a party (or its representative) is so close that it causes a
reasonable person to believe that it wil impact the TP's conduct. Parental
relationships are an example of the degree of closeness required before
evidence of the facts in the particular case will be determinative. 41 Outside
of such direct and close family relationships, restriction is likely to give
way to an effort towards balance. The focus is often on equality of the
relationships-neither party should be disadvantaged because the other party
has a closer relationship with the TP. 42 This attempt to secure balance often
guides the selection of TPs. The three-person arbitral tribunal common in
international commercial arbitration simplifies the task of equalizing

which ADR service provider will be used. The concern is that the TP will be biased in favor
of the paying client in the disputes, to the detriment of the other party. The potential for bias
produced by this situation has not yet been targeted by disclosure regulations, but it is clearly
a source of concern. See generally CPR Fonms Ethics Group, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COsTS OFLITIO. 14 (1995).
41 Courts have wrestled with the issue of how close a relationship must be to indicate
bias. For example, in Hobet Mining, Inc. v. InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers, 877
F. Supp. 1011, 1021 (S.D.W.Va. 1994), the court considered as one of four factors relevant
to a claim of evident partiality "[t]he directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and
the party he is alleged to favor.., keeping in mind that the relationship must be 'substantial'
rather than 'trivial,' in order to establish evident partiality." Cf. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby
Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983) ("relationship must be 'so intimate-personally,
socially, professionally, or financially-as to cast serious doubt' on the arbitrator's
impartiality"). It is generally accepted that at least in certain circumstances TPs will have had
prior connections to the parties in a dispute. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp.
1487, 1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see generally J. Lani Bader, ArbitratorDisclosure:Probing the
Issues, 12 J. INT'L ARB. 39, 46-49 (1995) (discussing the issue of relationships and bias).
42
See generaly Giorgio Bernini, The Conduct of the Arbitral Proceedings:Standards of
Behavior of Arbitrators, in Ice, THE ARBrRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF
ARBITRAToRS 31 (ICC Publishing, S.A. ed., 1991) ("Being neutral means having, and always
maintaining, a mental attitude which is, in concrete terms, wholly and actually equidistant viaA-vis the parties.").
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43

Restriction also has been used as a regulatory mechanism in response to

the perceived bias caused by the influence of future services. 44 Particularly
in the United States, where the market for dispute resolution services is
characterized by rapid expansion and competition, the need for future
business is a potential source of bias. TPs obtain work from references
about their past work, as do lawyers and other professionals generally. But
the parties to a dispute want to ensure that the TP will act impartially in
their dispute and will not be biased towards one side or the other in order to
curry favor so that he will be hired again in the future. 45 Particularly in
disputes involving one repeat-player party, the concern is that a TP will
favor that party in order to gain future business. 46 The TP may direct his

43A party-appointed arbitrator will generally have some connection to the party
selecting him, although the extent of the connection acceptable has been the subject of
controversy. See Hobet Mining, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 877 F.
Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D.W.Va. 1994). In the United States, party-appointed arbitrators
sometimes have been seen as party advocates, subject to lower standards regarding
impartiality than the third arbitrator. In international commercial arbitration, the partyappointed arbitrator is considered to occupy the same position as the other members of a
tribunal with regard to issues of impartiality and independence. For a discussion of the role of
the party-appointed arbitrator, see James H. Carter, Living with the Party-Appointed
Arbitrator: Judicial Confusion, Ethical Codes and PracticalAdvice, 3 AM. REV. OF INT'L
ARE. 153, 153-169 (1992); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Parry-Appointed Arbitrator in
InternationalControversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L LJ. 59 (1995); Robert Coulson,
An American Critique of the IBA's Ethics for InternationalArbitrators, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 103
(1987).
A similar effort at balance is at work in a scheme utilizing co-mediation at a Chicago
hospital, where each party chooses a mediator. See Carol McHugh Sanders, Rush Pres-St.
Luke's Hopes Its Mediation ProgramIs Contagious,CHICAGO LAW., April 1996, at 4.
44 The influence of future services might also be resolved in individual cases by
appointing a TP who is unaffected by the potential for such services because of her age,
financial security and reputation. One international arbitrator noted that he was selected for a
politically sensitive tribunal because of his age and position, which protected him from
needing to act in order to build his career, his freedom from concerns about his future made
him attractive for his impartiality and intellectual independence. See Interview #4 at 9.
45 See ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 3, at 4. See also Richard C. Reuben,
supra note 18, at 61.
46 The repeat-player issue arises when a particular disputant is involved in a number of
related disputes because of the nature of the disputant's business; the concern is that the
repeat-player will be advantaged because of its experience with dispute resolution generally,
and also that a TP may be biased in favor of the repeat-player in order to be selected as TP in
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attention toward the disputant or its representative, making detection even
more difficult.
This concern about bias from the prospect of future business might be
resolved by restricting a TP's successive participation in disputes involving
a common party. For example, the Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
proposed by the AAA, the ABA and SPIDR, counsel that a mediator cannot
subsequently represent one party to a resolved mediation without the
consent of the other party to that dispute if "legitimate questions about the
integrity of the mediation process" would be raised by the subsequent

representation.

47

its future disputes. On repeat-players generally, see Marc Oalanter, Why The 'Haves' Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal C7uage, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974);
Hazard & Scott, supra note 12, at 58-59.
It is more difficult to police the effect of repeat business within an industry but outside of
the common disputant. A TP can acquire general expertise through repeated involvement in
disputes common to a particular industry, and the concern is that the TP may develop a
sympathy towards the industry; in this situation, there will be no long-term relationship
between the TP and a particular party. While clients sometimes can require a lawyer to work
as an advocate for only one side of a dispute as a business matter, this power of a disputant
over a TP is generally lacking in ADR. One lawyer who works as a mediator in one
substantive area and as a consultant in an unrelated substantive area, commented, "I wouldn't
be comfortable mediating cases in the substantive area I do consulting, for the same client or
another person, because of potential conflicts. I wouldn't consult for people who are on the
opposite side [of the general issues] of my consulting clients." Interview #2 at 3.
47
Standards of Conductfor Mediators, 5 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 223, 224
(1994). The AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes also considers
future action as it casts an influence on an arbitrator's duties and warns arbitrators about
entering into relationships "likely to affect impartiality or... create the appearance of
partiality or bias... in circumstances which might reasonably create the appearance that they
had been influenced in the arbitration by the anticipation or expectation of the relationship or
interest.' Canon I(D), reprinted in PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBTRATION AND ARBrrRATORS 453 (2d ed. 1992).
See also In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 741-742 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (analogizing the standard for disqualification of a mediator to the position for
special masters).
[Clourts have recognized that it is inevitable that special masters-like court-appointed
experts, but unlike judges--will often be chosen from the ranks of practicing attorneys
who themselves have prior expertise in the subject matter and prior association with
experts in the field .... In light of this inevitability, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has found as a "general" rule that disqualification [of a special master] is
a matter for the exercise of discretion by the district judge, unless actual bias has been
demonstrated.
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Disclosure offers an alternative regulatory approach to restriction of
potentially influential relationships. In the context of bias resulting from
relationships that lead to the appointment of a particular TP, disclosure acts
to equalize the influence. In essence, it gives notice to both disputants of the
potential sources of bias, permitting consent or challenge. 48 This disclosure

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638, 860 F.2d 1168, 1174 (2d Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted).
48
The principle behind disclosure in ADR is to enable the parties to weigh the risk of
current influence stemming from past dealings against the desire to have this particular TP
work on the dispute. By consenting to the TP's appointment after learning of his past contacts,
disputants in effect waive their right to object to the conflict, absent other circumstances
showing that the TP actually acted in a partial manner. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 579 (1992); see also
Matthew D. Diseo, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a NeutralArbitratorMust Disclose
in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (1993) (distinguishing among the relationships that
indicate bias).
Nearly all regulations of ADR and TPs utilize disclosure, at least to some extent, to
address concerns about impartiality. Rule 7.3 of the CPR Rules for Nonadministered
Arbitration of International Disputes, for example, provides that a nominee must disclose
"circumstances that might cause doubt regarding the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.
Such circumstances include bias, interest in the result of the arbitration, and past or present
relations with a party or its counsel." RULES FOR NONADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES RULE 7.3 (1992). See also CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES INC.,
CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, MODEL ADR PROCEDURES, MEDIATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES
§ H.B. (1991).
The International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, Rule 4,
requires disclosure of all current and "more than trivial" past business relationships between
the arbitrator and any party, representative of a party, or a "potentially important witness in
the arbitration." INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION RULES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATORS RULE 4 (1992). Disclosure is also required of "substantial social relationships"
with parties or witnesses and prior relationships with co-arbitrators. PARKER SCHOOL OF
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE 1989 GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
ARBITRATORS 412 (1989). The AAA also offers ethics rules for TPs in commercial
arbitrations, and its disclosure obligation includes "existing or past financial, business,
professional, family or social relationships which are likely to affect impartiality or which
might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias." Id. at 418. See also Robert
Coulson, An American Critique of the IBA's Ethcs for InternationalArbitrators, 4 J. INT'L
ARB. 103 (1987). Arbitral institutions, such as the ICC, and statutory schemes, including
UNCITRAL, also include disclosure standards. See infra note 122. Finally, several states
have enacted disclosure rules for TPs; California's is the most comprehensive, requiring
disclosure of the results of a TP's other ADR work in order to inform the disputants of a
pattern of bias within an industry or substantive dispute. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
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enables the parties to protect themselves against favoritism for the purpose
of gaining future business. 49 But the reliance on disclosure to cure problems
of bias must be balanced against the value of secrecy for disputants in

§ 1281.9(a)C2) (Deering 1995). For a discussion of these issues and the California regulations,
see Bader, supra note 41, at 46-49. See generally Disco, supra, at 113.
Case law also supports a TP's obligation to disclose certain facts and relationships. See,
e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
Disclosure issues often arise in cases challenging awards on the basis of "evident partiality
... in the arbitrators." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). The current issue in the courts is whether
evident partiality means the mere appearanceof partiality or evidence of facts indicating bias
in the particular case. See Bader, supra note 41, at 45-46 (documenting that the mere
appearance of partiality is generally held insufficient). For an illustration of the current
boundaries of the disclosure obligation, see Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co., 40
Cal. Rptr.2d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Mediators' disclosure obligations are discussed in
McEnany v. West Del. Couw Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Iowa 1994); In
re Joint E. & S. Dist.'s Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 740-741 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See also Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995)
(articulating the standard to be applied to a mediator-attorney's subsequent representation of
one party to a prior mediation as "[w]here a mediator has received confidential information in
the course of mediation, that mediator should not thereafter represent anyone in connection
with the same or a substantially factually related matter unless all parties to the mediation
proceeding consent after disclosure"). On the Poly Soflware case standard, see Susan M.
DiMickele, Conflicts and the Cours, DIsP. RESOL., Spring 1996, at 3.
One aspect of the IRS' recently adopted tax mediation program is a requirement that
mediators prepare a written report stating the "issue(s) submitted for mediation and whether or
not the parties reached a settlement." IRS Launches Pilot Mediation Programfor Large Case
Appeals, 6 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 240, 241 (1995). The mediator's report will
be disclosed only to the parties, unless they otherwise agree; still, the requirement of a written
report creates the possibility for disclosure of the nature and consequences of the TP's
participation.
49 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a)(2) (Deering 1995) follows this approach, as
does Florida's regulation of the court-attached ADR program. Florida requires disclosure by
arbitrators of "any current, past, or possible future representation or consulting relationship
with any party or attorney involved in the arbitration." FLA. R. FOR COURT-APPOINTED
ARBITRATORS R. 11.080(b)(1) (1994). For a general discussion of court-attached mediation in
Florida, see James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is M the End of 'Good
Mediation'?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991). q:. James H. Carter, Liing with the PartyAppointed Arbitrator:JudicialConfusion, Ethical Codes and PracticalAdvice, 3 Am. REy. OF
INT'L ARB. 153, 168 (1992) ("Prior involvement in- arbitrations as appointee of the same
party, or involving the same counsel, are appropriate matters for mandatory disclosure but
ordinarily not a ground for disqualification.").
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m. THE MODELS
In this section, I will describe six models of TPs, each with differing
combinations of authority and impartiality. The models illustrate the variety
of what is meant by quality with regard to TPs. The diversity of the models
is supported by the market for dispute resolution services, which has
adjusted to take advantage of their differences.
The models are presented here in an order that places the most selfregulatory elite groups first, moving towards the least cohesive groups.
Each model shows how, in different locations or on certain planes of
activity, people distinguish themselves as capable of acting as TPs-they use
their distinctive characteristics to gain the trust of the parties to a dispute
and acceptance by the legal community in which the dispute is resolved.5 1
The models should not be interpreted as representing discrete, exclusive
categories; rather, the data supporting this categorization indicate that the
models are in fact tendencies that appear in contrast and comparison to one
another. In reality, a person who described herself in such a way that she fit
squarely within one model might, in a different context, consider herself
closer to others who define a second model. Her description may change
depending upon her competition; that is, the models can be viewed as
competitive with one another for the right to define quality. The models
may even overlap at times, and no model is innately superior to another.
The first two models can be described as self-regulatory elite models.
They are based upon settings where a small group controls the ADR work,
and these few people act in concert to maximize their control over the
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See, e.g.,

Alan Kirtely, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from meory to

Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,
the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 1.
51 See ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 3 (1988), where "the creation of

a profession is analyzed in terms of changes in jurisdictional control."
Professions develop when jurisdictions become vacant, which may happen because they

are newly created or because an earlier tenant has left them altogether or lost its firm
grip on them. If an already existing profession takes over a vacant jurisdiction, it may in

turn vacate another of its jurisdictions or retain merely supervisory control over it.
Id. ADR can be seen as a new, or expanded, jurisdiction, where a void exists with respect to
judges, lawyers, accountants and others. The issue of whether these existing professions will
fill the void or whether they and others will combine to form a new profession of TPs is still
open. See generally Benjamin, supra note 12, at 131.
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group's identity and the prestige of their work. In international commercial
arbitration, the members of the group assume various roles, sometimes
acting as counsel, other times as arbitrator. Members sometimes switch
sides within a general substantive controversy. 52 The self-regulatory elite
are a homogenous group because of bath self-selection and training. Their
ability to monitor each other's work, through control of the entire area (or
major share) of disputes, coupled with their promotion of the quality of
their services, provides assurance that the members of this elite group will
work together to produce a picture of authority and impartiality.
Two examples of the self-regulatory elite model emerged from the data:
English barristers who do international commercial arbitration and senior
European international arbitrators. In each of these groups, the participants
have been generally successful in monopolizing dispute resolution while at
the same time offering impartiality and authority.

A. QCs of the CommercialBar
Most of the relatively high stakes commercial arbitration in England53
is controlled by a small group of barristers, the Queen's Counsel (QCs) of
the commercial bar.5 4 Prior to 1979, this group of QCs controlled all of the

52

For example, one international lawyer who had represented an oil company in

connection with the nationalizations by Middle Eastern countries in the 1970s and 1980s was
later consulted by one of the Middle Eastern countries on several matters. He described the
earlier arbitration as "friendly"; he had maintained good relations with his opposing counsel,
which led to subsequent referrals. See Interview #3 at 20-21.
53
See generally ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 198-201 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the powers of arbitrators). "International
arbitration" in Britain has at least two different meanings. On the one hand, it means ICC-type
cases where the parties are from different countries and the essence of the dispute involves
international commerce-those disputes are generally controlled by the QCs. On the other
hand, there is an entrenched system of arbitration in England, including shipping and
construction disputes, where the parties are from different countries, but the rest of the dispute
is English-English contract and English law applies. These disputes are often resolved by lay
arbitrators. See DEZAL.AY & GARTH, supra note 21, ch. 7.
54 71c legal profession in England is formally divided into two basic groups of barristers
and solicitors. Solicitors numbered about 76,000 in England and Wales in 1994, and barristers
numbered about 7,735 at that time. See Gran'a Langdon-Down, Plan to Make Barristersmore
Approachable, NEss Ass'N NEwSFILE, Feb. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Home News File. Barristers have traditionally been seen as the elite of the two branches of the
profession, and within the group of barristers, a small group (about 10%) become Queen's
Counsel. See Frances Gibbs, Taking the Silk Road to Success, THETIMES (LoNDON), Oct. 19,
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borders of arbitration work. They not only acted as arbitrators, but they also
argued cases that were appealed to the Commercial Court and were part of a
small group from which were drawn the judges of the Commercial Court. 55
While this community has become more diverse since 1979, the commercial
QCs continue to exert substantial control over commercial and international
arbitration situated in London.
The group of QCs doing commercial arbitration and litigation has
traditionally been quite small. There are a limited number of chambers
performing sophisticated commercial work56 because barristers tend to share
chambers with other barristers in the same specialty, in part to ease
scheduling conflicts. 57 And of these commercial QCs, most participate in
commercial arbitration. As one member of the group commented, "I would
think that a substantial portion of the practice of any commercial Queen's
Counsel in London involves arbitration, either as counsel or as arbitrator.
It's part of the practice." 58 Another QC reported that "the arbitral
1993, at 35.
The preference for barristers over solicitors is also generally characteristic of domestic
English arbitrations. But see, Three New ADR Services in Scotland, 5 WORLD ARB. AND
MEDIATION REP. 259-260 (1994) (both barristers and solicitors are participating as mediators
in Scotland).
55 Prior to 1979, arbitral awards in England could be appealed and reviewed by the
Commercial Court, on the theory that consistency of arbitral awards with Commercial Court
decisions was important to the commercial attractiveness of English law. See REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 53, at 420-423. The QCs who acted as advocates in commercial
arbitration also acted as advocates in Commercial Court litigation, and they were among the
same people who served as arbitrators in these disputes. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note
21, ch. 7. Typically there would be two lay arbitrators and one QC chairman arbitrator.
Because the QCs controlled access to the Commercial Court, they also controlled the
commercial arbitral community.
On the role of the Commercial Court generally in international business disputes, see
Mary Heaney, Where Business is King, NAT'L LJ., June 5, 1995, at Cl, C1-C3.
56 "Barristers have always specialized .... But in London, a substantial number of sets
are known for their specialties: in 1967, there were six in tax, six in patents, two in
Admiralty, two in shipping, about six in heavy commercial matters .... " RICHARD ABEL,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 114-115 (1988). See DEZALAY & GARTH,
supra note 21, at 130 (reporting that the commercial bar "even today comprises less than 10
percent-some 550 out of 6,500-of the bar in general").
57 See ABEL, supra note 56, at 108.
58 Interview #27 at 1. Another QC reported:
It's just a way things happen in the law here. You ... acquire a certain reputation for
being quite active as a practitioner .... [Y]ou become a Queen's Counsel usually
somewhere between 40 and 45, that sort of age. And sooner or later once you're
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community here was actually very, very close."
The commercial bar works closely with the Commercial Court. Cases
brought or appealed to the Commercial Court are typically heard by justices
who came from the same chambers as the QC-advocates and arbitrators and
who have previously worked on the same sorts of cases as both advocate
and arbitrator. 60 The connection of advocates, arbitrators and judges among
the same group of people, who also share chambers in many cases (or did,
in the case ofjudges), led to an unanimity of approach, which gave the QCs
authority with regard to the substantive law and the procedural aspects of
the disputes. The QCs and the Commercial Court judges cooperated to
produce a predictable commercial law, applicable to all disputes regardless
of forum.
The structure of the system regulating English legal practice supported
this thorough control by limiting competition both from outside the group
of barristers and from within the group. The resulting homogeneity among
the QCs supports their authority as TPs. The regulation of entry and
organization of barristers' practice produces a close-knit group of mostly
socially elite professionals who are isolated from lay people and to some
extent from other professionals. 61 After their basic training, would-be

Queen's Counsel and you're doing this sort of work, somebody's going to say, "Can we
appoint you as an arbitrator...7"
Interview #28 at 3.
59
Interview #5 at 9.
60 See DEZAiAY & GARTH, supra note 21, at 132 ("The commercial bar would thus
bring cases to persons they knew and who were themselves formed in their practices through
work on the same sets of issues in the same chambers."). The substantive issues involved in
the cases might be the same regardless of a case's forum.
61 See generally BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS
25-27 (1967) (describing the development of the profession and the historical importance of
social status). Barristers resisted the efforts of the government to influence legal education and
entrance examinations, and they were isolated from the commercial world because of the
requirement that clients first consult a solicitor before retaining a barrister.
Restriction on entry into the profession of barrister has recently undergone change, with
a view to opening up the profession to gain diversity. But until recently, persons wishing to
become barristers needed "good social contacts," among other things, to successfully make it
into chambers. "[lit was generally agreed that given good social contacts, reasonable
academic achievement and attendance at a set number of Inns of Court dinners, success was
assured." Sharon Wallach, Law: Competition Is a Bar to a Job for Life, INDEPENDENT, Jan.
7,1994, at31.
Competition for work is intense among barristers, and it is difficult for young barristers
to find a place in chambers. See Sally Hughes, Fighting to the Death for a Place in
Chamnbers, THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 14, 1995, at 35 ("Inviting someone to join an
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barristers must complete a year-long pupillage in chambers-not necessarily
a paid position-and there are many fewer pupillages than there are
students. 62 The result of these entrance barriers has been that members of
the upper classes of the community have generally been more successful in
establishing themselves as barristers. 63 Furthermore, in order to rise to the
level of QC, barristers needed the support of judges, which further
solidified the connection between QCs and the judiciary. 64
established set is an ambivalent exercise, especially for the junior tenants, who will be
competing with any newcomer for briefs coming in, via the clerks. The Temple is rife with
stories ... of some of the best candidates being turned down precisely because of in-house
competition.").
62
The lack of payment means that would-be barristers must either have sufficient family
money to support themselves or apply to the select chambers that subsidize the pupillage
period. See Wallach, supra note 61, at 31. But see Roger Henderson, QC, Changing Faceof
the Bar, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 25, 1989, at 12. Henderson writes:
The financial hardship traditionally associated with pupillage has also been greatly
mitigated in recent years. Until the early 1970s pupil barristers were often required to
pay their pupil-masters for their year's apprenticeship. Happily, this practice has been
abandoned .... The vast majority of London chambers now offer pupillage awards. In
addition, some guarantee a level of income or a good supply of work in the second sixmonth pupillage which a trainee barrister must perform.
Id. See also ABEL, supra note 56, at 60-62.
In finding a place in chambers, nepotism is, or was until recently, still a factor. See
Hughes, supra note 61, at 35. See also Henderson, supra, at 12. Henderson notes:
[T]here have been noticeable changes in the origins of those whom it [the Bar] has
welcomed. A parental-occupation analysis of students of the Inner Temple ... shows
that of those now at the Bar who entered the Inn in 1964, 91 per cent came from social
classes A and B. By 1984, the proportion was 48.5 per cent, with 10.5 per cent from socalled lower and middle-class backgrounds and 22.5 per cent with a parent who was a
skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled manual worker. For example, the list of last year's new
QCs included the son of a coalminer.
Id.
63

See Fiona Cownie, The Reform of the Legal Profession or the End of Civilization as

We Know It, in THE CHANGING LAw 213-234 (Fiona Patfield & Robin White eds., 1990).
See also ABEL, supra note 56, at 75-76 ("[lt is class position that is being reproduced
more than membership in the profession."). Abel emphasizes the importance of a barrister's
class in determining success: "[C]lass affects pupillage, tenancy and ultimate success in
practice more strongly than it affects the calling to the bar." Id.
64 See id. at 98. On the issue of the identity of the judges and their relationship to
barristers, see ROBIN C.A. WHrrE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE 230-232 (2d ed. 1991).
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Along with the close identity between QCs and judges-both being
drawn primarily from the elite-is the similar connection of the
international commercial disputants to these groups. The disputants also
were members of the elite by virtue of their economic position; they met
with QCs and judges outside of formal legal proceedings, where they
discussed their problems.65 This close relationship among the parties to the
disputes and the QCs and judges enabled them to work together to create a
system of resolving disputes in a way that was helpful both to business,
through predictability, and to the QCs and judges, in providing them with
the necessary authority to resolve disputes.
B. The Core Senior InternationalCommercialArbitrators
International commercial arbitration became the accepted and expected
way to resolve international disputes 66 primarily because of the efforts of a
small group of Continental academics and, to a lesser extent, jurists. They
worked together to make international arbitration effective-in terms of both
enforceability 67 and acceptable procedures-and prestigious, mainly through
scholarship. A brief look at the way international commercial arbitration
developed indicates the character of the TPs who have become leading
arbitrators.
The "founders" of international commercial arbitration, who were most
active from the 1960s through the 1980s, came from the civil law countries
of France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Austria and
Italy. The core group was quite small, perhaps having as few as 10 to 15
persons at times, with more representatives from France and Switzerland
than elsewhere. In addition to this core group, there were networks of
interested lawyers in each country as well as representatives from countries
I do not mean to favor the class domination of QCs, only to suggest its relevance to the
characteristics of QCs as TPs.
65 One QC, describing the shipowners' relationship to arbitrators and QCs who might
act as advocates in arbitrations, said of the relationship between business people and lawyers:
"I.TMhe community was quite small because they would meet the judges and it was a very
symbiotic relationship ....They'd discuss cases .... ." Interview #5 at 11.
66 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
ConstructingInterationalJustcefrom the Compedtionfor TransnadonalBusiness Disputes,
29 L. & Soc'Y REv. 27, 35-42 (1995).
67

Enforement of arbitral awards is generally governed by the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York
Convention (adopted by the United Nations Conference on International Arbitration in 1958),
which regulates the recognition of such awards. See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG nr AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 659-679 (2d ed. 1990).
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outside of Continental Europe who participated, to varying degrees, in
international commercial arbitration work. 68
The members of the core group enjoyed positions of prestige in their
own countries, generally as academics. 69 The civil law professors" serve as

68 I've appeared in Scandinavia, in the U.K., in France and in Switzerland, in Italy and
I run into the same lawyers everywhere[;] it's the same names .... And so to that
extent I think the arbitration bar once you go ... outside the United States is a very
fungible group and it's the same people over and over .... [I]f this were Casablanca
we'd call them the usual suspects.
Interview #7 at 10-11. A member of this core group commented:
[L]ast year, for instance, I had two big arbitration cases and in both cases was my friend
Professor Goldman. It's always the same, you know... because of big cases you look
for people who have some experience .... [Y]ou fall back, in my opinion, mostly on
the range between 10 and 15 well-known names.
Interview #8 at 15.
69 The civil law tradition favors the separation of pronouncing the law and legal doctrine
from the taint of business interests. Merryman suggests that the divided profession
characteristic of much of the civil law world explains this separation: "One predictable result
is a tendency for the lines that divide one career from another to sharpen. Those involved in
one branch of the legal profession come to think of themselves as different from the others."
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 102 (2d ed. 1985).
Osiel furthers this analysis through examination of the competition of members of the
legal profession with nonlawyers, notably accountants and bankers. He suggests that the
specialist nature of courtroom work, which only a lawyer could do, impacted negatively upon
other work performed-but not exclusively-by lawyers. Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as
Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2030 (1989)
(reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILUP S.C. LEwiS EDS., LAWYERS INSoCIETY (1989)). Osiel
writes:
Whereas American bar associations have vigorously brought prosecution against
"unauthorized practice," and so have been "unusually imperial" . . . in pressing for
exclusive jurisdiction over legal counseling and advice, "laymen" in virtually all other
Western countries may perform many of the "legal" services that American lawyers
regard as uniquely their own. The scope of lawyers' monopoly in other countries is
generally strictly limited to activities such as advocacy in the highest courts (English
barristers), the transfer of real estate (English solicitors, until recently), or the formal
authorization of contracts and deeds (French notaires). "Nonprofessionals" who have
considerable legal education but who did not graduate from law school or obtain an
official license largely comprise the legal staffs of large organizations ....
To be sure, the individuals in such countries whom we would consider to be
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interpreters of law; their prestige traditionally was inversely related to their
proximity to commercial matters. 71 These academics were generally
members of the elite socioeconomic classes in their communities. 72 Their
privileged backgrounds supported their personal authority simply because of
their social position. They could afford financial independence as well,
giving them some degree of freedom from the concern over future business.
While their social status may have devolved from money made in business,
their professional status derived from being as separate from business and
trade as possible, giving the authority emanating from the status of law
professor more weight in connection with business interests from which the
"lawyers" seek, like their American colleagues, to derive much of their income from
these same services. But because the scope of lawyers' monopoly is too narrow to
provide a comfortable income, they must compete with members of other groups who
provide such services, groups whose members are often subject to fewer restrictions,
such as accountants and bankers.
Id. at 2030 (footnotes omitted).
Cr Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce
Practice, 28 L. & Soc'y REv. 149, 180-181 (1994) (considering the opposite force of the
influence of nonlaw work by nonlawyers on lawyers, specifically the influence of divorce
mediators, who are not lawyers, on divorce lawyers).
70
Richard Abel reported, "[lin northern Europe, law professors earn high salaries and
receive the highest prestige of any legal professional. In southern Europe ... they also enjoy
considerable status; but their low salaries compel them to spend most of their time in private
practice ...

."

Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Cil Law World, in 2 LAwYERS INSOCIETY

1, 12-13 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).
71 See MERRYMAN, supra note 69, at 108. In the common law system, this function of
interpreter is occupied by judges who, together with practitioners, discover "spaces" between
decided and stated law to use in reformulating and redirecting the law in the case of the judge,
and arguing for her client's position in the case of the practitioner. See Osiel, supra note 69,
at 2060-2061.
72 In France, for example, until the mid-1960s, most of those who attended universities
were members of the elite; furthermore, in order to become a law professor one needed
financial support during the years of study and until an opening at a university law faculty
became available. See David M. Trubeck et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of
the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REy. 407, 448-453 (1994).
The successful scholar would position himself as a disciple of a great professor and wait
until the appropriate time to be launched into his own career. "The uncertainty of success in
pursuit of a professorship is so great that few can afford to gamble exclusively on it."
MERRYMAN, supra note 69, at 107. The ability to pursue scholarship regardless of economic
support was one of several characteristics which distinguished these professors from
practitioners, whose backgrounds generally were less privileged.
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separation was needed. 73
The social and professional status of these senior professor-arbitrators
provided them with authority within their national systems, and the core

group of senior arbitrators organized internationally as well. They created a
small network, with themselves at the center, to convey and create
information about international commercial arbitration.

The participants in international commercial arbitration became
acquainted with each other not only through common cases, but also
through their participation in the professional organizations supporting
arbitration, such as the exclusive International Council for Commercial
Arbitration (ICCA) and the International Chamber of Commerce's Institute
of International Business Law and Practice. These organizations and others

sponsor colloquia, where interested participants can become acquainted with
one another, exchange views and stories about arbitration and initiate
newcomers to the field. 74 These meeting places-organizations, conferences
and journals-facilitate the exchange of information about arbitration's
participants. According to one international arbitrator, "[I]t's a small circle.

73 That is, the fact that the disputes being resolved were commercial in substance made
their separation from and autonomy with regard to business imperative.
Merryman clarifies the separation of law and commerce:
The doctrine is the basis of the legal system and is thought to represent objectively
stated scientific truth. The doctrine is not law in action, and indeed the scholar would
regard attention to such matters as diversionary.... He fears that if he became involved
in these activities [of enacting statutes or deciding cases], he might lose his objectivity
and perspective, and in any event would be misusing his time, which should be spent on
more fundamental, and hence more valuable, work.
MERRYMAN, supra note 69, at 81. The subtle change that can be seen in the professor's move
to international commercial arbitration is described by Dezalay and Garth. See DEZALAY &
GARTH, supra note 21, oh. 10.
74
See DEZAIAY & GARTH, supra note 21, ch. 1. The origins of ICCA, described by
one of its founders, illustrates the closed nature of the core group:
I was... in Europe representing the Netherlands at the discussion in Geneva ... [a]nd
...we had regular meetings with very nice delegates from other countries. And there
the idea grew-it was to bring friends--to organize more congresses on arbitration. And
so the first
congress was held in Paris with my friend lean Robert ....And at first
it
was not institutionalized. And then you know we institutionalized the whole thing.

Interview #8 at 5. The organizations, conferences and journals provide an opportunity to be
known by others active in arbitration, so that one's name might be remembered when the need
for an arbitrator arises.
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People know each other." 75 They recommend each other, even as they
76
oppose each other.

C. The Notable Model
The notable model is represented by an individual with a singular
personal reputation. This reputation is independent of any particular
affiliation, and it carries a presumption of wisdom and the perception that
this TP is above suspicion regarding impartiality. Every notable TP brings a
high degree of personal authority to the dispute resolution table. This
authority might be based upon experience in some aspect of negotiation or
in the subject matter of the dispute (which is one way to gain notoriety); it
might be based upon his prestige, earned quite apart from experience, and
the resulting respect of enough of the population-including the parties to
the dispute-to be recognized as worth listening to; or it might be based
upon a combination of these elements. 77

75

Interview #14 at 11.
76 See Interview #3 at 20-21; see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 21, ch. 2.
According to a senior arbitrator, "You're often appointed as a party arbitrator by someone
with whom you have worked before .... " Interview #10 at 13. One arbitration insider
described his experience as follows: "I'm doing right now ... a brief against ... somebody
who's been my co-arbitrator ... in another case you see, and I mean it happens that way."
Interview #16 at 16. Another European arbitrator commented, "[W]e have more of the
combination of arbitrators and lawyers [with] many people being arbitrator one day and a
lawyer the other day .... " Interview #25 at 5.
77 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Baseball Mediation: Get a Power Hitter, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1994, § 3, at 9 (dismissing the efforts of mediators from the Federal Mediation
Service to settle the 1994 baseball strike because the mediators were not notables). Feinberg
suggested Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf as possible helpful mediators,
both of whom fit the notable description. See id.
In international commercial arbitration, the notable is viewed more in the context of a
generational divide. The older generation was composed of a few men who where known as
the experts to everyone involved in international commercial arbitration. According to one
arbitration participant, "arbitration was characterized by a rather limited small group of
impeccable outstanding professionals-characters known around the world-whereas today I
have difficulty to see the outstanding personality." Interview #31 at 3. Another participant
characterized the senior notables as having "God-like complexes." See Interview #25 at 5.
One of these notables expressed his view of the benefits of notability in terms similar to those
used to describe Vance's role in the Macy's bankruptcy; he viewed his greater authority as
allowing him to more easily convince his co-arbitrators to join him in his judgment of the
dispute. See Interview #30 at 6.
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A recent account of the appointment of Cyrus Vance as mediator in the
bankruptcy proceedings of R.H. Macy & Co. illustrates the importance of
the authority of a notable TP. Contrary to normal procedures, the
bankruptcy judge appointed Vance as mediator without the request or prior
consent of the parties to the proceeding.7 8 Vance was brought in to gain the
respect and attention of the claimants. According to a bankruptcy lawyer not
involved in the case, "Egos needed to be reined in. 'What was needed was
someone that everyone has to say, "Yes sir" to .... Without somebody
like that, you have the question of who's in charge, who's making the most
money, who screams the loudest. There won't be any screaming with Mr.
Vance.'" 79 A similar comment was made by another outsider to the case:
Inflated egos create the need for an authority figure to impose civility into
what has become an uncivil situation ....When a mediator is appointed

in a multiparty bankruptcy case, the first step is often a "come to Jesus"
meeting among allthe parties. These meetings usually are different from
the multiparty meetings that have preceded them in only one respect.
Everyone says "Yes sir" or "Yes ma'am" to the mediator, and the
heavyweight bullies from the prior meetings become models of
80
decorum.
The notable's authority is his main attraction; especially in the
contemporary climate where civility is not always the norm, the presence of
the notable may bring a welcome measure of calm and restraint to the
proceedings.
A notable's authority is also related to his impartiality. Most notables
work as TPs only occasionally and do not rely on such work in order to
make a living.81 Their authority to act as TP comes in part from this

78 "Under the Southern District's standing order, parties are normally allowed to select
from a roster of mediators maintained by the court." Cyrus Vance to Mediate Macy's
Bankruptcy; Use ofADR Spreads, 5 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP. 101-102 (1994).
79
Mary Voboril & Edward R. Silverman, At Macy's, He's Called 'Mr. Vance,"
NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1994, at 45. According to this article, Vance's firm, Simpson, Thacher
& Bartlett, billed about $1 million in connection with his services as mediator in the Olympia
& York bankruptcy. "For Macy's, Vance will earn his customary fee, believed to be about
$500 an hour." Id.
80 Hugh Ray, Mediators, Egos and Common Courtesy, TEX. LAW., Mar. 14, 1994, at
22. See also McEnany v. West Del. County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 527
(N.D. Iowa 1994) ("Without acrimony, there would be little need for a mediator.").
81 This is true for both U.S. and international TPs. See DEZAIAY & GARTH, supra note
21, at 34 ("For the pioneers of arbitration, exemplified especially, but not only, by very
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independence from ADR generally; their notoriety arises because of their
non-ADR activities. They do not necessarily offer the expertise of the
senior international arbitrators or the QCs, since their investment in dispute
resolution may be limited, but they market themselves as independent-and
valuable-based in part on their separation from dispute resolution
generally.
The notable's claim to impartiality is based on exactly that separation,
and the resulting lack of need for future ADR business. A notable offers
impartiality because he does not need to please either side in the dispute. In
the Macy's bankruptcy, some concern was raised about conflicts of interest
between Vance and his law firm and the parties involved in the bankruptcy.
According to one report, his firm had "advised several of Macy's creditors
who were exploring possible bids for the retailer's assets." 8 2 And Vance

personally was a member of an advisory board for Chemical Bank, a major
creditor of Macy's. These connections did not cause objection by the major
parties involved in the bankruptcy; in fact, the existence of the connections
was not reported in most accounts of Vance's appointment. Again, his
status as a notable brings him above suspicion regarding his impartiality; it
is as if there is no rational basis for him being biased in any direction, due
to his personal standing apart from the dispute.8 3 As with respect to the
barristers and senior arbitrators, the elite nature of the notable is central to
the authority to resolve disputes.
D. The Judicial Model
The judicial model is related to the prior ones, but it has the dimension
also of official state authority. It includes sitting and former judges who do
private ADR work. In most cases, sitting judges may not work
simultaneously as TPs in private dispute resolution, but they are included
here in part because they set a standard against which TPs compete with
regard to authority and impartiality. Judges have the legitimacy of the state
behind their actions and are clothed with authority which supports their
interpretation of the law.84 Judges also are bound by a relatively strict code

senior European professors imbued with the traditional values of the European legal elite, the
dominant opinion has been that arbitration should not be a profession: 'Arbitration is a duty,
not a career.'").
82 Cqyrs Vance to Mediate Macy's Bankruptcy; Use of ADR Spreads, 5 WORL.D ARB. &

MEDIATION REP. 101-102 (1994).
83 "Vance filed a 'certificate of disinterestedness' with the court on February 22 stating

that he met the criteria required by bankruptcy law." Id. at 102.
84 Judges also participate in making law; the 1980s tender offer contests and cases
provide one example of this. See generally Yves Dezalay, Technological Warfare: The Battle
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of ethics which requires them to avoid acting where their "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 85 Their impartiality is also supported by
their freedom from concern about future business. Those who are appointed
for life, as are federal judges, are spared, at least in theory, the burden of
worrying about how their conduct on the bench will affect their success in
being reappointed or obtaining a subsequent job. Even without the
guarantee of appointment for life, judges ideally need not worry about
attracting business. As a result, they can act with more objectivity and
disinterestedness than if they were dependent upon their conduct in one case
86
to determine where the parties would bring their next dispute.
Because most U.S. jurisdictions prohibit sitting judges from acting as
to Control the Mergers and Acquisition Market in Europe, in PROFESSIONAL COMPEITON
AND PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE SOCIAL CONsTRUCTION OF

MARKETs 77 (Yves Dezalay & David Sugarman eds., 1995).
For a comparative view of lawyers and judges in the common and civil law systems, see
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATwIE LEOAL TRADITIONS 154-164 (2d ed. 1994).
85 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), Canon 3E(l): "A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which [his or her] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned .... "
Sitting judges engage in a variety of activities besides deciding cases, some of which are
also common to certain ADR processes. For example, judges conduct settlement conferences,
pre-trial discovery conferences and rule upon the acceptability of settlement agreements. The
ability of judges to maintain impartiality when participating in these sorts of activities has been
seriously questioned. See Judith Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 427428 (1982). Resnick writes:
The extensive information that judges receive during pretrial conferences has not been
filtered by the rules of evidence. Some of this information is received ex parte
.... Moreover, judges are in close contact with attorneys during the course of
management. Such interactions may become occasions for the development of intense
feelings-admiration, friendship, or antipathy. Therefore, management becomes a fertile
field for the growth of personal bias.
Further, judges with supervisory obligations may gain stakes in the cases they
manage. Their prestige may ride on "efficient" management, as calculated by the speed
and number of dispositions.
Id. See generally John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-making Functions, Ex Pare
Communications, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process-ValueAnalysis, 1993 UTAH L.
REv. 1135.

86 See generally Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusa Motions: Who Judges the
Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543 (1994). Sitting judges may anticipate leaving the bench
before retirement, and this may influence their work on the bench; but this is a relatively
recent phenomenon, encouraged somewhat by the popularity of ADR.
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TPs in ADR proceedings, it is not until they leave the bench that judges
serve as TPs in most instances.8 7 In leaving the bench, judges take some of
the prestige of their state connection with them, along with their experience
as impartial decision makers. These characteristics are valued in ADR, but
even more important is that judges also take with them their pre-judicial
status. For many, this pre-judicial status places them among the notables,
but with the addition of expertise in decisionmaking resulting from their
time on the bench. These TPs may then have the prestige of the notable
combined with specific experience in dispute resolution. Not surprisingly,
this sort of prestigious former judge is reported to be among the most
popular TPs in private dispute resolution. According to an executive at one
of the largest American ADR service providers, "ITihe vast majority of the
business and the vast majority of the cases are still done in the private sector
88
by former judges."
...

87 In some circumstances, sitting judges may also hire themselves out as private TPs.
This practice has been permitted in Sweden for many years, and consequently Swedish
"arbitration is 'a judicial way of settling disputes.'" DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 21, at
185 (citation omitted).
The Connecticut legislature initiated a similar practice in 1993, when it authorized judges
to work as TPs under the auspices of a nonprofit corporation, Sta-Fed ADR, Inc., offering
mediation services. The stated purpose of this organization was to induce judges to remain on
the bench instead of resigning or retiring to work in more highly compensated private dispute
resolution. Sta-Fed ADR, Inc. required senior judges to maintain a minimum level of work
for the court in order to offer ADR services. See Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as Private
Contractors:A Legal Frontier, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1993, at D20.
Both senior federal and state judges were eligible to join Sta-Fed, as were nonjudicial
lawyers who were approved by Sta-Fed's board of directors. See Janet Seiberg, The Canwr
Over Sta-Fed, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1993, at 1. Despite the judges' participation, the
reaction to the organization was not unanimously supportive. "Three plaintiff's lawyers
... say they have little faith in the abilities of most people on the roster." Id. Sta-Fed did not
attract the number of cases expected; in December 1995, its board of directors voted to close
the organization due to lack of demand for its services. See Elaine Song, The End of the Road
for Sia-Fed, CONN. L. TRiB., Dec. 25, 1995, at 1.
88
Interview #18 at 26. See also Karen Donovan, Searching for ADR Stars, THE NAT'L
LJ., Mar. 14, 1994, at Al ("Ex-judges, who dominate the panels at these [ADR service
provider] companies are still the most popular choice, largely because clients want an
approximation of what they get in court."). Commenting on the resignation of the presiding
judge of the Domestic Relations Division of Cook County Circuit Court to become a partner
and head of mediation services at a Chicago matrimonial law firm, another partner at the firm
stated that "having the former presiding judge.., would immediately place his firm at the top
of the mediation heap." Eric Herman, Presiding Judge to Preside Over Mediation at Divorce

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 12:1 1996]

For former judges whose independent status before joining the bench
was limited, the experience from judging is the key to their offering of TP
services. Former judges, not surprisingly, generally emphasize the
similarity of the TP and judicial roles. One former judge commented on his
change from a judge to a private TP:
I'm doing exactly what I used to do. There's been no transition at all.
Even in the area of mediation as you know the pressure on the judges to
move their calendars requires that they bring the parties in with an attempt
to settle the case .... And the judge is trying to get rid of a trial by
settling it before trial and he's a mediator. And you do that all of your
judicial life. So you're working on both the arbitration and mediation sides
89
when you're a judge.
In this respect, the former judges may emphasize not only their judicial
status, but also their contextual authority as ADR experts. And, of course,
once notables, barristers, arbitrators or judges decide, for whatever reason,
to commit themselves to the role of the TP, they naturally emphasize their
expertise and ability as well as their status.

E. The Substantive Expertise Model
TPs whose services are based upon their experience and knowledge of a
particular substantive area, such as securities regulation, family disputes or
intellectual property, represent the substantive expertise model. Their
expertise assures disputants of an educated-or quickly educable-TP, with
regard both to the dispute and to the context of the dispute. The dispute
resolution process should be faster, and consequently cheaper (at least
insofar as the fees associated with the process are concerned), because of the
participation of a TP with substantive expertise, as compared to the time
9
and cost associated with a TP who does not offer substantive expertise. 0 It
Firn, CHicAoo LAw., Nov. 1995, at 68. See also ESCAPING

THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 3,
at 51-52 (suggesting that judges do a high proportion of ADR in particular kinds of cases,
notably cases where the procedures used resemble judicial procedures, such as settlement
conferences and private judging); Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting Justice: Retired Judges Seize

Rising Role in Setting Disputes in California, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1996, at Al (describing
the "intense battle among the AAA and its rivals to snag judges and the money they
generate.").

89 Interview #19 at 21.
9) Related to TPs with substantive expertise, and as a result of the desire for expertise in
a decision maker, some states have adopted special procedures using certain judges for large
commercial cases, thereby giving disputants what they otherwise could obtain only by
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is exactly the ability to select such a TP with expertise in the subject in
dispute that motivates some disputants to try ADR in the first place. 91 This
substantive expertise provides the TP with contextual authority.
Specialization with regard to substance characterizes TPs who are
lawyers as well as those who are not. Divorce and child-custody dispute
resolution work traditionally has been the focus of nonlawyer mediators,
who base their authority in part upon their experience in family problems
apart from law.92 Labor negotiators, too, offer expertise in a particular kind
of dispute. Lawyers' specialization in practice lends itself to specialization
in ADR work as well, and there have appeared a number of special panels
93
of TPs based upon substantive legal expertise.

removing their dispute from the court system. See sources cited supra note 29; S. Gale Dick,
Special Cours Now Handle Business Cases, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LiG.

97, 97, 106 (1994) ("New York, along with Delaware and Illinois, is among the states now
experimenting with special court sections to handle business disputes. Commercial courts are
either up and running or under consideration in two of the three largest U.S. cities and in
jurisdictions covering roughly half the country's population .... mhe quality of the judges
in the commercial parts received high praise from users of the program.").
See generally Hazard & Scott, supra note 12, at 50 ("MTihe quest for different and better
tribunals of specialized jurisdiction is always political to some extent.").
91 Comments regarding the ability to select the TP as inducing participation in ADR
were couched as complaints both about the quality of the judiciary generally, and about some
recent judicial appointees' lack of common background as compared to corporate counsel,
leading to the fear "that the judges would be less sympathetic to their concerns." DEZTALAY &
GARTH, supra note 21, at 155. See also Peter D. Zeughauser, What's in a Name? Plenty,
AM. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 44. Zeughauser writes:
I bad two maxims about litigation that served as the sobering cold water necessary to
avoid costly litigation and instead engage in ADR: The first was that litigation is the
sport of kings; the second was that the courtroom is a dangerous place. After all, what
sober-minded business person wants an important dispute decided by a group of 12
strangers who know nothing about the underlying business much less by a former D.A.
who was appointed to the bench because of his or her skill in locking people away for
crimes that were more often than not self-evident?
Id. at 44.
92 See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to EnsuringFairnessin Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1351-1353
(1995); Alison LaCroix, Taking the Creative Road to Divorce, Bus. J. MILWAUKEE, July 15,
1995, at I.
93 See, e.g., JAMS Launches Major Environmental Initiative, 5 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 79 (1994); An ADR Arena Sits Davids and Goliaths, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COSTS OF LrTIo. 17 (1994) (CPR panel of mediators for franchise disputes);
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The experience which supports a TP's substantive expertise might be
derived from a number of sources, including law practice, nonlaw
professional consulting and course work. 94 These sources of expertise do
not necessarily create a community of substantive specialists, as was the
case for the QCs, because the accumulation of experience by one TP may
not bring her into contact with other TPs offering comparable expertise.
The sources of expertise may be too diverse to assure commonality. As a
result, the substantive expertise model does not necessarily provide
individual TPs with the ability to act as a group with regard to selfregulation or otherwise. That is not to say, however, that such groups may
not form.
Similarly, the absence of a common background in the substantive
expertise model makes it difficult to predict whether an individual TP will
have personal authority. Some TPs whose services are based upon
substantive expertise may be relatively marginal in their professional
communities, and yet capable of working with the merits of disputes.
Others will bring substantial outside reputations to their role as TP.
Substantive expertise does not necessarily coincide with personal or political
status. Without personal authority, substantive expertise TPs may be so
immersed in mindset with the issues of their area of expertise that they lack
balance as TPs. Substantive expertise raises the concern of too much
connection or sympathy with a particular industry or point of view. TPs
with personal authority as well as substantive expertise will be motivated to
protect their larger reputations, apart from ADR, and this may cause them
to avoid succumbing to this influence. But those without personal authority
may not be so motivated. In addition, the possibility of industry disputants
having repeated disputes, encouraging favoritism in exchange for business,
also causes concern here.
The absence of a shared background and community also correlates
with an openness to the creation of expertise. For example, greater diversity
is possible among the TPs who offer their services based upon substantive
95
expertise than for the self-regulatory elite models.
InsurersAgree to Try ADR, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LTIG. 18 (announcing
the formation of the CPR Insurance Panel). See also Gordon T. Walker, Big Finns Should

Offer More ADR Services, 21 LrM. NEWS, Mar. 1996, at 7 ("The ability of large firms to
bring true subject matter expertise to the ADR process distinguishes them from many of the
profit and non-profit ADR providers.").
94 Another source for substantive expertise may be ADR itself; for example, the World
Intellectual Property Organization was organized to produce rules governing arbitration and
mediation of intellectual property disputes, and potential TPs gain a measure of substantive
expertise through participation in conferences and activities sponsored by the organization.

95 Diversity among TPs has generated concern, especially with regard to industry or
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F. Expertise in Method
TPs who define their expertise as involving the method of arriving at
the resolution of disputes emphasize the uniqueness of ADR methodology
and the importance of experience and training in this methodology. 96 They
distinguish themselves from others who rely on contextual authority apart
from ADR, such as judicial experience. These TPs may be career TPs, and
generally favor the professionalization of this role. They offer themselves in
contrast to those who serve as TPs only occasionally, by emphasizing their
experience as-and the need for expertise in the work of-TPs.
This methodology expertise model is visible along a continuum from
those persons who rely upon their expertise as an entrance ticket into the
work of ADR, to those for whom this expertise is simply the form around
which they structure their participation as TPs. Both groups, as well as
ideological sympathy. See generally Minority and Women-Owned ADR Firm Opens in San
Francisco,6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 48 (1995); Dave Thom, Mid-Market Players
Want a Piece of the ADR Pie, RECORDER, July 26, 1995, at 1 ("Like most of its recently
formed competitors, Diverse ADR is targeting a specific segment of the market: customers
looking for so-called neutrals with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds.").
96 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationalesfor Mediation,
80 VA. L. REv. 323, 323-324 (1994) ("Arbitration ... asks the arbitrator to replicate the
decision of a court. A mediator, by contrast, stops short of recommending how the dispute
should be resolved.") (footnotes omitted). Brown and Ayres describe the economic value of
mediation by focusing on what they identify as the uniquely "mediative" process of caucusing
with disputants. Their analysis supports ascribing value to the expertise of TP work, as it
relates to mediation, in terms of the necessity for mediators to understand and negotiate with
the disputants their intended use of confidential information during caucuses.
See also Robert D. Benjamin, The Mediator as Trickster: The Folklofic Figure as
ProfessionalRole Model, 13 MEDIATION Q. 131, 132 (1995) ("Mediation practice is not based
as much on a distinct substantive knowledge base as it is on a process and holistic presentation
and application of information gleaned from many professional disciplines. Unlike the more
traditional professional, mediators are not experts; they help disputing parties gather and apply
the expertise of other professionals.").
On mediator training generally, see Alison LaCroix, Taking the Creative Road to
Divorce, Bus. J. MILWAUKEE, July 15, 1995, at 38 (describing the mediation firm, Out of
Court Solutions Inc., which teams mediator-lawyers with therapists); Kate Thomas, ADR's
Regulatory Road Already Well-Traveled by Other States, TEX. LAW., July 10, 1995, at 1;
New ADR Referrals Only for Atorneys, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 17, 1995, at 14 (According
to Susan Podziba of SPIDR, "30 hours of mediation training ... is insufficient to turn
attorneys into mediators. . .'Mediation and ADR are completely different from
advocacy.'").
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those in between, typically define themselves as specialists in the art of
mediation. They emphasize their skills in listening, translating and deal
making; but for the former group, this emphasis begins and ends the
discussion, while for the latter group, it is only one part of their offering.
For the former group, methodology expertise defines their offering, or
"capital." One example of this is found in the family dispute area, where
mediators who are trained in psychology or social work focus upon the role
of TP as directed towards the marital relationship, with the goal of
transforming the relationship from conflict to cooperation. 97 One mediator
described his role as "hearing and interpreting what the parties are
saying." 98 These mediators view themselves not as monopolizing the
dispute discussions, but rather as facilitating the parties' conversation;
unlike Cyrus Vance in the Macy's dispute, their reputations are not used to
tame the disputants' egos. Rather, they view the best resolution as one
which originates with the parties themselves. "'The mediator is the leastimportant person in the room ....It's the parties involved that matter.'" 99
The success of the process is tied to its effect on the disputants'
relationship.
It is possible, although still relatively unusual, for a TP specialist to
become a big name mediator with the stature of a notable. Kenneth Feinberg
provides an example of this. Mr. Feinberg was formerly a member of the
prestigious law firm, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, which he
left to establish his own mediation firm, Kenneth R. Feinberg & Associates.
He has been involved in several large tort cases, including the Agent
Orange litigation. He recently established an ADR education firm, Mediate,
Inc., which will "'educate U.S. executives ...about the nature,
1° °
advantages, limitations, and dynamics of alternative dispute resolution.'"
Feinberg is identified with the methodology expertise model as a result of
his commitment to, and identification with, mediation and other alternatives

97 See Michael Benjamin & Howard H. Irving, Research In Family Mediation: Review
and Implications, 13 MEDIATION Q. 53, 69 (1995). Law trained mediators, on the other hand,
may view their goal as TP as simply producing a settlement to the divorce dispute.
98
William C. Smith, Alternative Dispute Resolution: From Buzzwords to Business, PA.
LJ., Nov. 6, 1995, at 54 (quoting Edward Pereles, Philadelphia labor arbitrator and
mediator).
99 Katie Brown, Retreat From Courtroom Battles Made PhillipsMediation Pioneer, S.F.
Bus. TIMES, May 30, 1988, at 12 (quoting Barbara Phillips). A mediator who specializes in a
particular type of commercial dispute characterized her role in similar terms: "Mediation is
about listening, giving the parties a sense of control over the problem." Interview #2 at 4.
100 Feinberg Launches Educational and Training Finn, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 210, 210 (1994).
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to litigation, but he offers a different variety from the family mediators. Not
surprisingly, he emphasizes reputation as important for effectiveness in
mediation, as opposed to simply emphasizing mediation techniques. For
example, he has advocated the use of a "well-known person, someone with
presence, political connections and a weighty reputation" for large or
political disputes, urging that ability in mediation methodology is necessary
but insufficient in such cases.1°1 We thus see how notability and expertise
can blend in the elite of those who commit themselves to practice as TPs.
Those who emphasize methodology-wherever they come from-tend
to agree on the uniqueness of the skills of a good mediator, as opposed to
the skills of a good litigator, arbitrator, judge or lawyer. 12 According to a

10 1

Kenneth R. Feinberg, Baseball Mediation: Get a Power Hiter, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.

21, 1994, § 3, at 9. Similarly, Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller and Laura Petersen found that
"more than half of all neutrals see fewer than 10 disputes annually, while less than 10 percent
of the neutrals see more than half of the disputes." ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE, supra note 3,
at 49.
Another example of the big name methodology specialist might be former President
Jimmy Carter, who, when asked about the difference between conflict resolution between
nations and between individuals, said, "'I don't think there's any difference in the principles
involved .... Even in arguments between two kids on the school grounds, or between a
husband and a wife that led to divorce, or a war between two nations ....'" Kristiana
Helmick, For a Spas or War, Who Ya Gonna Call? Feudbusters, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONIToR,
June 7, 1995, at 1.
102 See Brown, supra note 99, at 12 (quoting San Francisco mediator Barbara Phillips,
president of American Intermediation Service) ("A good mediator must have good judgment,
compassion, intelligence and experience-the wisdom that comes through experience. The
best mediators are deeply grounded people with a lot of personal ballast and a lot of depth.
They cannot become part of the problem, they have to be impervious to it."). But see Jacques
Werner, ADR: Will European BrainsBe Set On Fire?, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 45 (1993) (urging that
ADR does not include any ideas new to the existing methods of resolving disputes).
Not all methodology specialist TPs are mediators. In international commercial
arbitration, the younger generation of arbitrators viewed themselves as more fully committed
to the role of arbitration participant than the older generation, who viewed arbitration not as a
career but as a duty. See Interview #22 at 3. As one member of the younger generation
commented:
I think it's bad for international arbitration for people to approach it in an amateurish
way. That doesn't mean that the only people who should ever be arbitrators are those
that have a lot of experience.... But there are far too many people who consider that
becoming an arbitrator is part of the things that happen to you when you become a
senior respected lawyer.
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mediator at an ADR services firm, "the skills [of a judge] are absolutely
transferable as an arbitrator; not necessarily as a mediator .... They are
radically different procedures, they have enormously different legal effects,
and the skills are different." 103' Another mediator-lawyer who advocates the
art of mediation described his initial thinking about mediation as "basically
... the arbitrator wearing a nonbinding hat and getting settlements by
telling people.., how the arbitrator would decide the case if the case were
real." 104 That same mediator now sees himself as aligned with "folks who
tend to resolve disputes by reconciled interests and they might be called the
deal makers .... whose stock in trade is I can help you because I know
10 5

how to make deals."
Expertise in methodology can be learned, and this model of TP
emphasizes the importance of training in ADR techniques. 1°6 This emphasis
is also a competitive tool that permits entry into the work of TPs by those
whose prior experience and status would not otherwise provide them a way
into the work. Those who complete training and market their services as
TPs solely on the basis of their methodology training may lack personal
authority; the TP may have no other "platform" from which to market his

Interview #29 at 52.
103 Interview #18 at 7. See also Donovan, supra note 88, at Al. Donovan also had
reservations about a judicial approach to ADR:
[L]awyers, who are among the biggest purchasers of mediation services, have
discovered that a judicial perspective is not necessarily the best buy in ADR. Tactics that
make a judge successful in settling cases from the bench are often ill-suited to and quite
different from the friendly persuasion that is key to successful mediation.
Id. Similarly, a British solicitor commented on the differences between arbitrators and
mediators: "Sometimes arbitrators are not suited for mediators and a certain type of arbitrator
would not make a good mediator. They are too used to sitting back and hearing evidence
rather than working with the people towards.
Interview #26 at 26.
104 Interview #21 at I.

. .

a solution that will settle their differences."

105 Interview #21 at 14.
106 However, some believe that good mediators are born, not trained. See Donovan,
supra note 88, at Al (quoting John Bates).
On training generally, Tom McDonald's comments are instructive: "A societal need
exists for all kinds of mediators whether they have a law license, a terminal degree or have
never attained a higher education, but each one needs to be properly trained and required to
abide by ethical standards as a matter of public policy." Tom McDonald, Finding a Win-Win
Solution: 7Te Credentaling Conflict Between Attorney and Non-Attorney Mediators Threatens
to Undermine the ADR Movement, TEX. LAW., Mar. 4, 1996, at 15.
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services. 10 7 A corollary of this absence of personal authority is the tendency
towards TP work as a career, rather than as an activity ancillary to a
central-or at least earlier-career outside of ADR.
This distinction between career TPs and those who serve as TPs only
occasionally can be a dividing line for many ADR participants.108 In
international commercial arbitration, the senior arbitrators viewed their
occasional participation as ideal and supportive of their impartiality. As one
American participant in the international arbitration community commented:
I'm old fashioned. I think that the person who goes into this business as an
arbitrator to make a living should not be encouraged. To me, the concept
of international arbitration is to take someone who is busy, who's not
doing this full-time .... I get nervous about full-time arbitrators, because
to me they become too beholden either to the ICC or to parties to appoint
them or whatever it is. So I like truly independent people who are not
1 9
doing this for a living. 0
These same concerns are relevant to the career TP in the United States,
who may be influenced by the promise of future business or induced to
favor a repeat-player party more easily than a TP whose major career
commitment lies elsewhere, because this TP must attract business for her
livelihood. On the other hand, the career TP must be watchful to maintain a
reputation of integrity in order to support her career; one might argue that
the career TP has more reason to guard her impartiality-as well as her
image of impartiality-than the occasional TP, who need not rely on this
image for support. Indeed, one lawyer articulated the desire to select a
career TP on the basis of his "stronger financial incentive to be better,
'whereas a retired judge goes back for another round of golf.'" 110 Both
career TPs and distinguished amateurs have their proponents. As ADR
expands, however, the number and prominence of full time TPs can be
expected to increase. Notables in heavy demand may respond to that
demand by committing themselves more fully to ADR.

10 7

The comments of an international arbitration participant are relevant here: "You

can't get into the game at all unless you've got a platform. You can't just sort of say, I would
really like to be an arbitrator or a counsel for a party in large arbitrations." Interview #13 at
16.
108 As a practical matter, however, most TPs cannot generate enough business to
support themselves without an ancillary career. See, e.g., Helmick, supra note 101, at 1.
109 Interview #23 at 19.
110 According to a senior litigation counsel at Motorola, Inc., "Panel mediators cannot
bi as good as someone who does it every day." Donovan, supra note 88, at Al.
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IV. OUTLINES FOR REGULATION

These six models provide the basis for analyzing the quality-that is,
the authority and impartiality-of TPs, which in turn is the basis for
creating an analytical approach to regulation of TPs. The models may
appear as discrete categories, each with its own version of quality. In
reality, the models appear mainly in comparison to each other, and the

quality offered by one model is best assessed in relation to the
characteristics of other participants in the dispute resolution market. The

categories may change as demand for ADR increases; competition may
result in one model taking on some of the characteristics of another. As

ADR becomes more widely accepted, certain basic knowledge may be
required for every entry into the TP market; disputants may come to expect
all TPs to be capable of serving a variety of roles, which may require TPs
to complete some sort of basic training before offering their services. The
nature of the offering is also changing in terms of the timing of the TP's
entry; the current focus on early dispute identification and resolution may
add to the mix of TPs now offering their services. 1 This fluidity is
difficult to capture in the description of the models, but it is essential to an
accurate consideration of the current field of ADR.
In light of these qualifying comments, we return in this section to the
examples of TPs described in the introduction-the notable TP, the former
judge serving as TP, and the securities industry specialist-to examine them
in light of the models and the principles of authority and impartiality, and to
indicate the direction regulation of these TPs might take.
The first example of a particular kind of TP was Cyrus Vance's role in
the Macy's bankruptcy. Vance is the epitome of the notable TP. He was
appointed for his authority-his ability to control the parties and their
lawyers-rather than for his technical ADR skill. The notable generally
gains notoriety outside of dispute resolution work, as did Vance; unlike the
QCs and senior international arbitrators, selection of a notable is not
necessarily motivated by his reputation in ADR. As a result of this emphasis
on status, the notable may lack the experience which defines contextual
authority to act as TP.

The risk of a notable serving as TP in a situation in which he lacks the
experience and knowledge necessary to guide his conduct as TP, however,

111 See, e.g., Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Wy
It Doesn't Work and Why It Does, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1994, at 120, 130 (reporting
on NCR's use of ADR to "report, analyze, address, and resolve ... [disputes] before they
can fester into litigation.").
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is relatively small. The notable's conduct, in ADR and otherwise, is guided
by his intent to preserve and foster his reputation, both with respect to his
role in ADR and generally. This interest will cause the notable to selfregulate and restrict his participation to situations in which he can be sure
that his services will be appropriate. As a result, requiring special training
for notable TPs in order for them to do ADR work may be unnecessary
because we can rely upon the notables to obtain the training necessary to
enhance their reputations for such work. In the Macy's dispute, it would not
have been useful to reject Vance as TP simply because he had not received
particular training in ADR techniques. His status as an authority figure was
the attraction for the disputants, and his experience as a negotiator was
sufficient in those circumstances.
Apart from authority, the notable must also give assurance of his
impartiality in order to satisfy concerns about quality. Again, the notable's
interest in protecting his reputation will lead him in the right direction; as
with contextual authority, we can expect the notable to self-regulate against
bias. But this self-regulation for notables occurs only on an individual basis.
The group of core arbitrators and QCs, in contrast, regulated one another as
well as themselves, providing an additional layer of censorship to obtain
impartiality. This group impact is absent in the notable model-there is no
community of notables, they do not necessarily know one another, work
together or select each other for ADR work. Almost by definition, the
number of notables who can be counted on for this kind of assignment is
very small. While self-regulation with regard to contextual authority is
acceptable, in the case of impartiality it is riskier, since the benefit possibly
gained by a favored disputant may result in that disputant misinforming
others regarding the TP's conduct.
The notable's status, however, brings with it a certain degree of public
attention.11 2 In the Macy's bankruptcy, Vance's relationships to claimants,
individually and through his law firm, were disclosed in the press, albeit
not widely. The possibility of media attention helps to ensure that conflicts
are exposed, not only through investigative reporting but also by the notable
as a result of the threat of such reporting. Consequently, the fact that a TP
is a notable, who will attract media attention or thinks he will attract media
attention, gives some measure of assurance to disputants as to the TP's
willingness to disclose conflicts of interest. 113 So long as the notable is

112 Of course the problem of defining notable--including a definition which includes
press attention-remains.
113 International arbitration insider comments include:
[The arbitrators] I like the most I wouldn't for an instant harbor the suspicion that they
will lean my way because they will be reappointed .... JT]he ones I really respect I
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subject to general disclosure obligations regarding specific relationships to
the disputants and their representatives, actual or threatened press coverage
will likely cause the disclosure of other relevant information. Again,
however, it is clear that the number of persons with this kind of notability
will be very small.
The senior core arbitrators present a similar and contrasting story to the
notable model. In some sense, the senior arbitrators are also notables;
certainly to the average disputant, the senior arbitrators would be selected
on the basis of their status in the world of international commercial
arbitration, as well as because of their expertise. In terms of notoriety
outside of the world of dispute resolution, some of these senior arbitrators
would attract the sort of media attention characteristic of the notables, but
114
such attention would not be assured in every case.
Media attention is replaced (or perhaps supplemented) by a selfregulating community in the senior arbitrator model. The relatively small
size of the group of senior arbitrators-although larger than the number of
public figure notables-combined with their activities at conferences, in
scholarship and in cases, can create a sensitive market in information about
the group's members. Such a market has provided information about
arbitrators which enabled the appointment process to function smoothly.
Because the arbitral system is confidential, it is difficult for business people
to gather sufficient information about potential arbitrators to confidently
choose a good candidate. 115 Yet one of the main attractions of arbitration is
don't deceive myself for one second because I've been in cases where I've lost. Where
these same people huddled against me and I'm still interested in appointing them. But I
was convinced by their award.

Interview #27 at 25. "[Olne has to watch out that counsel is not selecting the same person.
Because otherwise... you get into a situation where it rightly or wrongly could be conceived
as a relationship which could give rise to problems." Interview #28 at 10. "(Ylour reputation

may be influenced by [repeated appointments by one party]." Interview #29 at 23.
You will sometimes have parties that ...

put forward someone who is clearly not

independent. And he may or may not qualify his statement of independence. We'll send
it out to the other [side] and say what do you think ....

Do you object or do you accept

this person. And quite often they'll accept.... I think partly reasoning that this man is

so tarnished from the beginning and everyone knows that, that he is never going to carry
any weight with the other two arbitrators.

Interview #30 at 11.
114 For an example of media attention focused on an international arbitrator who is
clearly also a notable, see Jeremy Edwards, 7he Five-Million Pound Man, LEGAL BUS., Apr.
1994, at 51 (discussing international arbitrator Pierre Lalive).
115 According to a participant in international arbitration, "No one knows exactly how
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the ability to choose the decisionmaker. 11 6 The job of suggesting
appropriate arbitrators often falls to a business client's lawyer, and if that
lawyer is an insider to the world of arbitration," 7 the client is on its way to
appointing a good arbitrator.11 8
The market in information about arbitrators not only provided positive
guidance about appointment of TPs, it also provided information about who
not to appoint. 1 1 9 While there are stories about arbitrators who favored one

an outsider can appraise the quality of certain performers in this game ....

It's almost

designed to prevent them from being able to make any objective judgment ....
I mean the
only people who really know, are the people in the field." Interview #9 at 15-16.
116 As a prominent international arbitrator said, "[One] is appointed as a party arbitrator
presumably because one is thought likely to be receptive to their arguments." Interview #10 at
12.
117 As one arbitrator commented:
And when we are called upon either as counsel, which occasionally happens to me, or
co-arbitrator to give advice on either an arbitrator or the chairman, on the whole we
don't make real mistakes .... But I will call two or three people whom I trust and I
would say, well I don't know so and so very well, what can you tell me about him. And
then once you've called two or three people, with your own knowledge, you ... will
find that you know... you get the feeling of who is who.
Interview #11 at 2.
118 The client's position was well described by one international participant:
If the party to the arbitration is what I call a sophisticated buyer of legal services, they
will know who to hire as lawyers. And they will know who to appoint as arbitrators.
And if they are themselves not a sophisticated buyer of legal services but engage a
sophisticated buyer of legal services or sophisticated law firms to help them, they will
become a sophisticated buyer of legal services.
Interview #9 at 15. This same informant spoke of a client who did not know enough to retain
a sophisticated law firm, but it obtained a sophisticated engineering firm which managed the
case and retained sophisticated legal counsel. See id.
But see Lewis Maltby, ParadiseLost-How the Gimer Court Lost the Oppornunityfor
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTs. 1, 1-2
(1994) (discussing the U.S. ADR world without regard to this ability of and need for insiders
to help select TPs).
1 19
As a member of the arbitration network commented, "[I]f your reputation for
integrity is damaged ... I would have to think very hard the next time about suggesting that
person as a possible arbitrator because that, that gets around very, very quickly, somebody is
damaged goods." Interview #7 at 21.
Similar information exchanges occur on a local small-scale basis in very different
contexts. For example, in a recent report about a mediation program at a Chicago hospital, a
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side with private communications or other partisan conduct, 120 the core
group of senior arbitrators were not subject to serious criticism in this
regard. They held their reputations above financial incentives, even though
they clearly profited from their work. According to one lawyer who has
participated in international arbitration, "The egos of the arbitrators are too
big to be bought or they're too sincere, to say it more kindly." 12 1 The
controlling factor was self-selection-the members of this elite group of
arbitrators recommended and appointed each other, and the parties to the
disputes accepted their control, so long as they were assured of a fair chance
to present their case; consequently, the appointment process was kept

plaintiff's lawyer was selecting a mediator from a list approved by the hospital and "discussed
with other lawyers the names of all defense attorneys on the roster. 'Of those on the list, I was
told to avoid two attorneys,' Ashbell said. In their views, the defendants can do nothing
wrong." Carol McHugh Sanders, Rush Pres-St. Luke's Hopes ItsMediation Program is
Contagious, CHic. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 43.
12 0
The arbitration between Aramco and the Saudi government over oil rights in the
Buraimi Oasis is an example of arbitration allegedly interrupted by attempted bribery. See J.B.
KELLY, ARABIA, THE GULF AND THE WEsT 71-73 (1980). See generally DEZALAY & GARTH,
supra note 21, at 81-85. See also Lawrence F. Ebb, A Tale of Three Cities: Arbitrator
Misconduct by Abuse of Retainerand Commitment Fee Arrangements, 3 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
177, 179 (1992) (giving an example of failure to disclose relationships by an international
commercial arbitrator).
121 Interview #17 at 10-11. The core group of senior arbitrators considered the
arbitrator-advocate a second class citizen, at best. The comments of Pierre Lalive, a senior
European arbitrator-scholar, at an ICC conference directed to the issue of independence, are
relevant:
I would like to propose to include arbitrator independence, within a synthetic definition,
objective and subjective at the same time, as implying the independence from situation
on one side, and the independence of spirit on the other side .... [Ildependence
implies the courage to displease, the absence of any desire, especially for the arbitrator
appointed by a party, to be appointed once again as an arbitrator.
Lalive, supra note 28, at 121. Another European arbitration participant commented:
If you appoint someone who you think will act as an advocate for you, you make an
enormous mistake. If you appoint, as the developing countries do, somebody simply
because you know he will vote for you, people have no influence at all. It is always
better to appoint a competent lawyer to whom the chairman will listen, rather than a
friend.
Interview #16 at 2. See also Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in
InternationalControversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L LJ.59 (1995).
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outside of a pure win-lose orientation. 122 Through their control of the
market, the core arbitrators freed themselves from significant partisan
influence from the disputants. 123

12 2

It is outside the scope of this article to bring the story of the elite international

arbitrators to the present, but it should be noted that their monopoly has been challenged. See
generally DEZALIAY & GARTH, supra note 21, ch. 13.
Information about potential arbitrators also often is solicited from the nominees
themselves, through disclosure statements required by most arbitral institutions. The ICC
requires such information in its statement of independence, but not all nominees provide the
information willingly; Lawrence Ebb reports that in a case in which he served as counsel, the
arbitral institution
asked him [the nominee] to set out... the details of any possible financial or economic
relationships he might have had during the preceding ten years with the defendant
company or with a specified group of companies .... He adamantly refused to declare
whether any such linkage existed or had ever existed, stating that he did not understand
the questions and urging the organization to accept as a satisfactory and complete
declaration his ispe dist that he had a general reputation for independence.
Nevertheless, independent inquiry revealed that he had been a member of the board of
directors of not one but two companies wholly owned by the parent company that also
wholly owned the other party.
Ebb, supra note 120, at 179. On the ICC's statement of independence generally, see Stephen
Bond, The Selection of ICCArbitraors and the Requirement of Independence, 4 ARB. INT'L
300 (1988); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, An Arbitrator'sDeclarationof Independence, 2 BULL. OF
THE SWISS ARB. ASS'N 85 (1991).
123 The QCs occupy a slightly different position with regard to issues of partiality
because of their relationship to one another. Barristers may not form partnerships with other
barristers, with solicitors or with other professionals. See John Kendall, Barristers,
Independence and Disclosure, 8 ARB. INT'L 287, 287-288 (1992). This image of isolation has
been carried over into the matter of relationships and bias, so that barristers are generally
presumed impartial because of the legal barriers to their formal relationships. Of course, this
image of independence derived from the regulation of barristers' practice does not necessarily
guarantee impartiality. See Jeremy Edwards, Inns and Outs, LEaAL Bus., Nov. 1993, at 6064; Kendall, supra, at 287-288.
Even though barristers are prohibited from practicing in partnership with one another,
they do work in sets of offices; yet, this sharing of chambers has not given rise to a
presumption of bias. See id. at 288. John Kendall comments:
Not unnaturally, those who are unfamiliar with the way barristers operate assume that
conflicts of interest can arise in barristers' chambers in the same way as in solicitors'
firms. This is not so .... The [Bar's] code [of conduct, para. 504(b)] does not mention
in this context [requiring a barrister to cease to act in a matter] membership of the same
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The idea of a community of TPs might also be characteristic of certain
segments of the market represented by the technical expertise model. This
model is based upon a certain expertise that might be gained from shared
experience, such as formal education programs. A formal training or
general education program provides the ability to select the participants,
permits them to become acquainted with one another and might form the
basis for subsequent continued contact and mutual influence. Although the
data informing the models does not provide an example of such a structured
group, regulation could create this structure in furtherance of the goal of
impartiality.
Like the senior arbitrators, the judicial model TP also presents a
relative notable, where status is part of the attraction for disputants, and
chambers as another barrister working on the same case.
Id. at 288-289.
Regarding U.S. lawyers sharing office space and the application of the conflict of
interest rules to them, see Arthur Garwin, Suite Hannony: Protecting Cient Confidentiality
While You Share Space, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 88 (noting that Illinois State Bar Assoc.
Opinion 783 (June 28, 1982) considers office sharing equivalent to affiliation, so lawyers who
share office space cannot represent adverse parties).
Barristers from the same chambers have been involved in cases on opposite sides, or as
advocate and arbitrator, and when challenged on grounds of bias resulting from these
relationships, courts have consistently considered the relationship resulting from shared
chambers insufficient to annul or reverse an arbitrator's action, regardless of the disputants'
knowledge of the relationship. See Kendall, supra. But see Stephen R. Bond, 7he Selection of
ICC Arbitratorsand the Requirement of Independence, 4 ARB. INT'L 300, 308 (1988). Bond
notes:
Nominees [for arbitrator] have also been refused confirmation in instances where the
nominee had professional ties to a party's counsel, i.e., acted on their behalf In one case
a prospective arbitrator who was a QC had been retained by defendant's counsel to plead
a matter unrelated to the arbitration and the opposing party objected.
Id.
The concern here is the relation between barrister and solicitor, which is more akin to
lawyer-client. It is an issue not of bias towards a particular party or ideology, but rather
influence stemming from the identity and credibility of a party's representative. There has
been some effort towards general disclosure of the possibility of a relationship among QCs
involved in an arbitration. Several QCs have responded to the challenges by inserting an
explanation of their independence and position in marketing materials. See Kendall, supra, at
298.
Disclosure, however, does not supply a basis for challenging the relationship in a
particular case. Yet perhaps this influence is no more threatening to a TP's impartiality than
the influence on a court of a prestigious attorney's participation in litigation.
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experience in dispute resolution also motivates the selection. The judicial
model TP lacks the self-regulating community of the senior arbitrators as
well as the media attention of the notable. Furthermore, the status or
personal authority of those represented by the judicial model also is less
consistent than the senior arbitrators or notables. While some element of
personal authority may be present in the judicial model, and it is clear that
former judicial status is attractive to disputants, the former judge's
investment in reputation is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy concern about
impartiality. Given the lack of assured publicity and the absence of a
community for group regulation, the current system of ADR relies entirely
upon the individual TP to regulate himself with regard to impartiality. As
more TPs move into ADR as a career, the risk of bias from promised future
business, coupled with the confidentiality characteristic of ADR generally,
combine to undermine confidence in the effectiveness of individual selfregulation as the only mechanism available for assuring impartiality.
A regulatory approach to the former judge TP should take into
consideration the relative personal authority characteristic of the model,
meaning that the TP's conduct will be motivated, at least in part, to nurture
his reputation. In order to connect that motivation with the TP's conduct in
ADR, it must be related to his success as a TP. Such a connection can be
accomplished in a number of ways. For example, members of this judicial
model could join together to offer their services and provide information
about themselves to disputants. They could, in effect, create a community
similar to that of the international senior arbitrators, including advising
disputants about selecting TPs who are members of the community. 124 The
community might be housed in an organization formed specifically for that
purpose, or it might be based within an ADR service provider firm which
specializes in offering former judges as TPs. This approach capitalizes on
the existence and value of personal authority.
Substantive expertise TPs, such as the third example of securities
arbitrators, do not necessarily possess personal authority. Unlike the models
discussed so far, which are all characterized at least in part by personal
authority, the substantive expertise model is identified with expertise in the
merits of the dispute. There may be TPs who fit within this model who also
possess personal authority, even notoriety, with regard to the group of
persons specializing in the particular substantive area. But the main
attraction of these TPs is their knowledge and understanding of the merits of

124 Creating informed disputants may encourage resolution of conflicts. See generally
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperationand Conflict
Between Lawyers In Litigation, 94 COLuM. L. Ray. 509, 522-527 (1994) (discussing the
utility of a market for information about lawyers' reputations for cooperation).
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terms of time savings and consequent
the dispute, and the advantages in125
costs associated with that expertise.
The substantive expertise of these TPs raises the concern that their
expertise will bring with it an alignment with a particular position within
the substantive area, or simply a general sympathy to an industry position.
Repeated representation of or participation within a particular industry may
influence the intellectutal independence of a TP at the same time that it
provides insight. The risk of bias is bolstered by the secrecy generally
surrounding ADR, which causes concern that the TP's sympathy will be
hidden from the disputants. 126 Furthermore, when industry arbitrators are
career TPs, their repetitive involvement in such disputes raises the concern
that the TP will favor the repeat party in order to secure future ADR
127
business.
These concerns about partiality are evident in the current securities
industry arbitration system. Securities arbitration is generally handled by
industry organizations, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), the self-regulatory organization for the brokerage
industry. In NASD administered proceedings, the NASD Director of
Arbitration appoints the arbitrators; the sole arbitrator or a majority of the
panel must not be "from the securities industry," and, if there is a panel of
arbitrators, a minority may be from the industry. 128 The securities industry

125 See, e.g., Arthur V. Pearson, ADR in Application, RECORDER, Mar. 13, 1996, at 8
(urging the benefits of ADR for accounting malpractice disputes). Pearson notes:
ADR in this area provides helpful options for parties in dispute. These options all have a
common advantage: the ability to obtain a mediator or arbitrator who has knowledge and
experience in taxation or accounting standards such that they can use their expertise to
bring some clarity to the tax or accounting issues being argued.
Id.
12 6

Securities arbitration awards are publicly available. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF

SEcuRIEs DEALERS, INC., NASD MANUAL 1991, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
§ 41(f) (1991) [hereinafter NASD MANUAL]. But settlements of securities disputes are not
uniformly required to be disclosed. See Floyd Norris, What To Do About Broker
Arbitrations?,N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at DI.
127 This risk may increase if the recommendations of the Task Force on securities
arbitration are adopted, which will encourage professionalization of the role of arbitrator as
well as increase compensation for securities arbitrators. See REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION
POuCY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES

DEALERS, INC., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM (1996) [hereinafter Task ForceReport].
128 See generally NASD MANUAL, supra note 126, §§ 13, 19; Linda D. Fienberg &
Matthew S. Yeo, The NASD Securities Arbitration Report: A View from the Inside, INSIGHTS:
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supports the system of specialist arbitration; ease of enforcement and
industry subsidization of the cost of arbitration are offered as
justifications. 129 Others, however, urge that the industry's control of
arbitration negatively impacts upon the fairness of the process. According to
Representative Edward-Markey, "'Christians had a better chance against the
lions than many investors and employees will have in the climate being
" 130

created' now.

TPs in securities arbitration are either formally 'connected to the
industry or are specialists in securities matters. Those who are formally
connected to the industry, for example through employment, may favor the
position of the industry party to the dispute or, at a minimum, act as an
advocate for the industry disputant. Even without evidence of partiality or
advocacy, the connection of industry TPs to the securities industry, coupled
with their selection by the NASD, presents an image of partiality towards
an industry disputant that may be impossible to overcome.
The "public" arbitrators also may have difficulty satisfying the concern
for impartiality. These public arbitrators are not directly employed within
the industry but may be lawyers or academics who specialize in securities
law matters. 13 1 Their training and expertise in securities issues raise the

THE CoiPRAT & SEcuarrfis LAW ADviSOR, Apr. 1996, at 7. The sense of unfairness
characterizing securities arbitration results from the NASD's appointment power as well as
from the characteristics of the industry arbitrators.
The recent task force studying the securities arbitration system recommended using a list
procedure for arbitrator selection, which would decrease the NASD's control over
appointments; this change would address part of the concern that industry control prevents a
level playing field. See Task ForceReport, supra note 127, at 94-96; Arbitration Task Force
Issues 70 Recommendations in Largest Revamping of Securities Arbitration Since Its Star
More Than a Century Ago, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 22, 1996 (available in Lexis/Nexis database:
NEWS library; PRNEWS file); Rachel Witmer, Panel Recommends, NASD to Consider
Reforms to Securities ArbitrationSystem, 28 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 104 (BNA) (1996).
129 See Susan Antilla, Brokerage Firms Steer Dissatisfied Customers Away From Court,
but in Only One Direction, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at A29.
13 0
Margaret A. Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Losing Battles: Investors Fare Poorly
Fighting Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at Al. See Barbara Presley Noble, At Work;
Attacking Compulsory Arbitration, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1995, § 3, at 21 ("Those with
grievances and their representatives say the industry picks its arbitrators from a Wall Street
'old boy' network that is especially unlikely to look favorably on discrimination claims,
requires little-to-no knowledge of employment law, conducts its operations in secret and
explicitly tells its mediators they neither have to follow the law nor explain their decisions.").
See generally Hazard & Scott, supra note 12, at 50-51 (discussing the inherent problems of
specialized tribunals).
131 The Code of.Abitration Procedure defines arbitrators as either from the industry or
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possibility of industry sympathy. If these public arbitrators become career
TPs, their repeated exposure to the issues raised in industry disputes may
make them jaded, particularly towards naive investors.1 32 And although the
lure of future business cannot directly influence a TP, because TPs are
selected by the NASD, the NASD is an industry organization and investors
may worry that it is unlikely to repeatedly appoint TPs who rule against
industry parties. The comments of a lawyer with experience in securities
arbitration are apt: "The arbitrators who awarded nothing... tended to be
those with close ties to the securities industry-or those who were career
arbitrators so dependent on their income from arbitration cases that they
could not afford to alienate securities firms by ruling in favor of
customers." 133 The combination of substantive expertise and full time work
as a TP may be overwhelming to impartiality.
The difficulty in addressing the concern about impartiality in this
situation stems from the fact that the attraction of industry specialists-their
expertise in the substantive area-is also the cause for concern. In order to
eliminate the risk of bias, the advantages of specialization would also be
eliminated.
Restating the problem in terms of authority provides insight into an
appropriate regulatory approach. The substantive expertise TP assures
disputants of contextual authority but not necessarily personal authority, and
as a result, there is concern that the TP's identity with the industry and her
need for future business derived from that industry may overly influence her
conduct. The TP's investment in her reputation may be insufficient to guide
her conduct towards impartiality. 134 Regulation must address the risks
not. The definition, found in section 19(c) of the Code, identifies as industry arbitrators those
who are employed by members of the NASD or other broker-dealers, persons who were
employed by such organizations, as well as an attorney, accountant or other professional
"who has devoted twenty (20) percent or more of his or her professional work effort to
securities industry clients within the last two years." NASD MANUAL, supra note 126,
§ 19(c)(5). See Task Force Report, supra note 127, at 96-97 (discussing the distinction
between industry and public arbitration).
132 Jacobs and Siconolfi comment: "[]nvestor lawyers contend that too many arbitrators
are 'jaded, impatient and overused,' as attorney Seth Lipner says .... The National
Association of Securities Dealers, which administers more than 80% of the claims, admits that
some arbitrators were used too often in 1993 after it imposed a minimum-training requirement
and the number of arbitrators plunged." Jacobs & Siconolfi, supra note 130, at Al.
133 Scot J. Paltow, An ArbitraryProcess?, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1995, at DI (quoting
lawyer Stuart C. Goldberg). See also Jacobs & Sinconolfi, supra note 130.
134 Labor cases submitted to ADR are sometimes published, and it has been reported
that labor TPs carefully select the decisions they publish to present a picture of balance
between cases favoring management and cases favoring labor. Labor lawyers typically
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resulting from this absence of personal authority.
We could regulate securities industry arbitration to permit only TPs
who possess personal authority to participate. This regulation might be
accomplished by creating a public organization to conduct securities
arbitration, providing those associated with it official sanction, or by
restricting entry into the work of the securities TP to those with independent
status. These proposals would result in a very limited number of TPs being
available, however, and the large number of securities disputes generated by
the current regulatory system would be frustrated by this limitation.
The risks associated with the absence of personal authority also can be
addressed by a combination of disclosure and certification. Disclosure
creates information for disputants at the same time that it enables TPs to
invest in their reputations-disclosure encourages the reputation to be built.
If a TP's reputation is assessable by those who control the appointment
process, the TP will be motivated to nurture her reputation. Transparency
will cause the TP to guard her reputation for impartiality because
information indicating favoritism will cause consumers who are not
members of the favored group to reject her nomination. The favored group
might be the industry representative or might more generally be repeat
player parties; in either case, so long as every disputant has both access to
relevant information and a veto power over appointments, the TP will guard
her reputation against influence to further her opportunities for selection. 135
To this end, information about participation in prior disputes must be
disclosed in order to establish a market in information about TPs, and this
information market must be connected to the selection of TPs. The
information disclosed must indicate the satisfaction of disputants and their
136
representatives with the TPs' services. It must be personal information,

represent either management or unions, but not both.
Similarly, the core arbitrators in international commercial arbitration have tried to avoid
alignment with a particular position within a substantive area by switching roles and,
sometimes, sides in different subject-related disputes. For example, one lawyer who had
represented an oil company, generally as well as in arbitration, was subsequently hired as a
consultant in an arbitration by an oil producing nation. This was due at least in part to the
close relationship that developed between the country's representative and the lawyer in
previous dealings. See Interview #3 at 20-21.
135 The current system permits each party one peremptory challenge to the NASD's
selection of arbitrators. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 126, § 22. This is insufficient to
permit consumers sufficient control over the selection process to connect information to
reputation.
136 On the importance of personal information about mediators, see Linda C. Neilson,
Mediators' and Lawyers' Perceptions of Education and Training in Family Mediation, 12
MEDIATION Q. 165, 171 (1994). Neilson states:

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTERESOLUTION

[Vol. 12:1 1996]

similar to the kind of information available to the senior core arbitrators
about one another; disclosure should include the identity of disputants and
their representatives, the nature of the dispute and its resolution and the role
13 7
of the TP.
Disclosure must be connected to the appointment decision in order to be
effective. This might be accomplished by providing the information to
disputants generally, before their participation in the dispute resolution
procedure is initiated, and permitting them to use the information as
guidance in selecting TPs. 138 In the alternative, or in conjunction with such
disclosure, the information also could be made available to an independent
agency, unrelated to the securities industry, organized to receive and filter
the information and participate in selection and certification of TPs within
the substantive area. The agency could perform a variety of functions in
addition to receiving this information, including coordinating training
programs for TPs, monitoring TPs' conduct, reviewing TPs' conflict of
interest procedures and receiving complaints about TPs.13 9 The agency
performing these roles also would be able to certify TPs regarding their
performance, and the agency might even certify TPs as being in good
standing regarding impartiality issues for particular disputes. By connecting
disclosure to the selection decision, this regulatory system encourages TPs
to conduct themselves to create positive information about their reputations.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion of the kinds of regulatory responses suggested by the
models for the examples of TPs first described in the introduction leaves
many aspects of a TP regulatory scheme unexplored. But the discussion has
identified the basic issues of such a regulatory scheme, including the

Although the mediation practitioners ...

almost unanimously recommended specialized

education and training for new mediators, the vast majority considered personal
characteristics more important than the acquisition of either substantive knowledge (that
is, knowledge of law, knowledge of adult and child psychology) or procedural conflict
resolution skills. The consensus was that mediators must have certain personal qualities
in order to properly learn and apply knowledge, skills, and techniques.
Id. Regarding available information regarding individual arbitrators, including evaluations of
co-arbitrators, see Task Force Report, supra note 127, at 98-102
137 The NASD Manual currently governs disclosure of arbitration awards, including the
names of the arbitrators. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 126, § 41(t).
138 See Task Force Report, supra note 127, at 98-100.
139 See generally MAOAu SARFATrI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAUSM: A
SOciOLOGCAL ANALYSIS xvi-xviii (1977).
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significance of personal authority, the possibilities for self or group
regulation and the necessity of disclosure to a much greater extent than is
now mandated. The identification of these issues as key components of the
regulatory scheme for TPs is a result of the analysis being based upon
empirical information about the kinds of TPs now participating in the
dispute resolution market. The availability of this empirical information is
essential to the formulation of a regulatory approach; it informs us about
what exists, what works and how it works-and fails to work.
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